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I. INTRODUCTION-WHAT EXPOSURE DO AIRCRAFT
LESSORS HAVE TO PASSENGER WRONGFUL DEATH AND
PERSONAL INJURY SUITS IN A POST-AIR
PHILIPPINES WORLD?
O N APRIL 19, 2000, a Boeing 737, Air Philippines Flight 541crashed into a hill while attempting to land on Samal Is-
land in the Philippines.' All of the persons on board were Phil-
ippine citizens, and sadly, all of them perished in the accident.2
In August of 2000, an Illinois resident, Jovy Layug, whose
mother was on board Flight 541, filed a wrongful death state
court lawsuit in Cook County, Illinois, naming as defendant the
original aircraft lessor, AAR Parts Trading Inc.' The initial com-
plaint was based solely on a theory of products liability but was
twice amended to ultimately include ten additional theories.'
The amended complaint also named the successor lessor, Fleet
Business Credit, as an additional defendant.' The new theories
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I Ellis v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
2 Id. at 729.
3 Id. at 730.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 730-31.
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of liability against AAR Parts Trading and Fleet Business Credit
included negligence and negligent entrustment.6
The aircraft lessors moved to dismiss, arguing that 49 U.S.C.
Section 44112(b) precluded the state law claims against them
(Section 44112). The federal statute appears, at least at first
glance, to insulate commercial aircraft lessors from legal liability
for death or injury to passengers of air carriers operating aircraft
under lease from those lessors. Section 44112 is a part of the
Federal Aviation Administration Act of 1958 (FAA Act of 1958)
and is titled "Limitation of liability."' The text of Section 44112
reads as follows:
44112. Limitation of liability
(a) Definitions.-In this section-
(1) "lessor" means a person leasing for at least 30 days a civil
aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller.
(2) "owner" means a person that owns a civil aircraft, air-
craft engine, or propeller.
(3) "secured party" means a person having a security inter-
est in, or security title to, a civil aircraft, aircraft engine,
or propeller under a conditional sales contract, equip-
ment trust contract, chattel or corporate mortgage, or
similar instrument.
(b) Liability.-A lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for per-
sonal injury, death, or property loss or damage on land or
water only when a civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller
is in the actual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or
secured party, and the personal injury, death, or property
loss or damage occurs because of-
(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or
(2) the flight of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, en-
gine, or propeller.'
The state court shocked the defendants but caused the plain-
tiffs to jump with joy with its answer to the motion. The court,
relying on an earlier state court decision, denied the motion
and held that the statute does not preempt Illinois law, which
makes commercial aircraft lessors answerable for damages
caused by their alleged acts of negligent entrustment and prod-
ucts liability.10
6 Id.
7 Layug v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc., Nos. 00L9599, 2003 WL 25744436 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. 2003).
8 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2008).
9 Id.
10 Layug, 2003 WL 25744436.
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The lessors later asked the state court to dismiss the claims,
arguing Cook County was an inconvenient forum." The court
denied that motion as well.1 2 Numerous other heirs of the Air
Philippines disaster joined Layug as plaintiffs." Now stuck in
Cook County, a venue perceived as heavily biased in favor of
plaintiffs, the defendants finally paid approximately $165 mil-
lion to settle the suits.14
Naming American aircraft lessors as defendants has thus
come to be seen by the plaintiffs' aviation bar in the post-Air
Philippines world as the magic bullet that slays the specter of a
forum non conveniens dismissal, particularly in wrongful death
lawsuits arising from foreign air disasters which have no Ameri-
can decedents. But, on the other hand, the Cook County han-
dling of Air Philippines has frightened the American commercial
aircraft lessor community into recalling the John Donne poem:
"Therefore, send not to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for
thee.""5
Which side of the argument is correct? Is there really a new
and viable strategy where the domestic aircraft lessor provides a
jurisdictional hook for foreign aviation accidents? The issue
begs the question: Is Lessor More?
The issue is not academic. As much as fifty-three percent of
the aircraft operated by the world's airlines are under some
form of leasing arrangement.' 6  Many of these aircraft are
owned and leased by American aircraft lessors." The problem
is bound to resurface time and time again.
It is important to point out there are two basic leasing ar-
rangements: finance or capital leases, and operating leases.18
The legal liability could differ depending upon whether a fi-
nance lease or an operating lease is at issue." Under a finance
11 See Ellis, 828 N.E.2d at 731-32.
12 Id.
1 Id. at 731.
14 The O'Reilly Law Firm, Ellis v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc., http://www.oreilly
law.com/results/air-philippines-settlement.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
15 John Donne, Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, No. 17 (Mediation) (1624).
16 The Airline Monitor, Financial Characteristics of Airlines (2006) http://
www.airlinemonitor.com/tutorial2.html#Financial.
17 Id.
18 Rod D. Margo, Aspects of Insurance in Aviation Finance, 62 J. AIR L. & CoM.
423, 425 (1996).
19 See generally Legal Opinion as to Whether the Lessee of an Aircraft Conveyed
Under a Finance Lease is the Owner of the Aircraft for Purposes of United States
Aircraft Registration, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,877 (Mar. 26, 1981).
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lease, the lessor essentially provides the financing or capital for
the airline to acquire new aircraft or equipment. 20 In this ar-
rangement, the lessor only retains a security interest in the air-
craft, while the lessee "has absolute dominion over the aircraft
'to do with as he will even as against the [lessor] so long as pay-
ments are made."' 2 ' The lessor is the owner only for aircraft
registration purposes.2 2 Accordingly, a finance or capital lease is
typically made for the life of the aircraft.2 1
An operating lease is typically for a shorter term, several years
as opposed to the life of the aircraft. 24 The airline has physical
possession of the aircraft.25 It provides the fuel, maintenance,
and crews.2 ' But the lessor typically retains a right to inspect the
aircraft and to audit the maintenance and flight history.2 7
In 2006, of the major U.S. air carriers,2 36% of the aircraft
they operated were under some form of leasing arrangement.2 1
Of the leased aircraft, 15% were on capital leases and 85% on
operating leases.3 o Continental, the airline that advertises hav-
ing the newestjet fleet, was leasing seventy-five percent of its 641
aircraft.3 ' U.S. Airways was a close second with 74% of its 279
aircraft under a leasing arrangement.3 2
From these statistics it is easy to appreciate the large role that
aircraft lessors play in supporting the operations of airlines.
Some of these airlines, although properly certificated by their
home nations, might be listed on the European Union's Black-
list (E.U. Blacklist). And some of the nations from which the
20 Id. at 18,878.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See Margo, supra note 18, at 425.




28 For this article's purpose, major air carriers are: American Airlines, Conti-
nental, Delta, FedEx, Northwest, United, UPS, and U.S. Airways. The statistics in
this section are from 2006, so not all mergers may be accounted for.
29 RESEARCH & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., SCHEDULE





33 The E.U. Blacklist is a list of airlines banned from operating within the E.U.
due to poor safety levels. European Commission, Air Safety: List of Airlines
Banned Within the EU, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air-ban/listen.htm (last
visited Feb. 15, 2010).
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airlines operate might be designated as Class 2 by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA Class 2) pursuant to international
programs implemented by the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization." Should a lessor, irrespective of Section 44112,
hesitate to lease to an airline properly certificated but neverthe-
less on the E.U. Blacklist or listed as FAA Class 2 because of a
fear of potential legal liability for negligent entrustment?
Because of their large role in commercial aviation, aircraft les-
sors are naturally an alternative potential deep pocket in
America if non-American claimants from foreign air disasters
are unable to reach the manufacturer or airline in an American
court. The lessors must naturally act to protect their invest-
ments and their own financial well-being by insuring their air-
craft and including "detailed and sometimes complex insurance
specifications" in their leasing arrangements."
In addition to acquiring their own insurance and mandating
that the lessee obtain insurance, lessors will include lease terms
that restrict where the aircraft can be operated, 6 specify how it
is to be maintained," make the lessee bear the risk of loss," and
contain broad default provisions." These provisions could
themselves become central to a fight over whether the aircraft is
liable for negligent entrustment.40
34 The Federal Aviation Administration will be referred to simply as the FAA.
The International Aviation Safety Assessments program (IASA) is a technical
agency of the United Nations responsible for monitoring safety standards estab-
lished by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Nations cur-
rently classified as Class 2 and unable to satisfy ICAO standards include: (1)
Bangladesh; (2) Indonesia; (3) Uruguay; (4) Zimbabwe; (5) Belize; (6) Cote
D'Ivoire; (7) Croatia; (8) Democratic Republic of Congo; (9) Gambia; (10)
Ghana; (11) Guyana; (12) Haiti; (13) Honduras; (14) Kiribati; (15) Nauru; (16)
Nicaragua; (17) Serbia and Montenegro; (18) Swaziland; (19) Paraguay; and
(20) Ukraine. FAA, Int'l Aviation Safety Assessments Program, Assessments Re-
sults (June 8, 2009), http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/;asa/. The airlines on
the E.U. Blacklist correspond roughly in origination but not completely to the
nations listed as Class 2. European Commission, supra note 33. There are cur-
rently approximately 143 airlines on the E.U. Blacklist. Id.
5 Margo, supra note 18, at 427.
36 See Aircraft Lease Agreement between General Electric Capital Corp. and
TRC Realty Co. (1999), http://contracts.onecle.com/restaurant/gecc.lease.
1999.11.09.shtml (restricting the aircraft to North America and the Caribbean in
Section 6(d)).
3 Id. at § 7.
3 Id. at § 9.
3 Id. at § 12.
40 By aircraft lessor, the author is focusing on the commercial or financial air-
craft lessor that leases commercial aircraft to commercial air carriers. While it
732010]
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There have been important changes since Air Philippines, mak-
ing a repeat of the Cook County disaster for aircraft lessors less
likely. For example, the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdic-
tion Act (MMTJA) became applicable to accidents on February
1, 2003.4 Under the MMTJA, the Air Philippines air disaster
would have been removable from Cook County to federal court.
Presumably, a federal court would have taken a more sympa-
thetic view of preemption under 49 U.S.C. Section 44112(b).
But the MMTJA applies only to accidents with seventy-five or
more deaths.42
A. Is LESSOR MORE?
The answer to that question depends in part upon a resolu-
tion of the inherent tension between federal and state law in the
regulation of commercial and recreational aviation. There is lit-
tle doubt that Congress could completely occupy the field of avi-
ation if it chose to do so, but through the present, our
politicians in Washington have been careful to reserve to the
states a large role in aviation. 43 The result has been uncertainty
at times over where federal management of aviation ends and
where state management begins.
There are only two instances where Congress has expressly
preempted state regulations. The first is the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978 (ADA), which prohibits the states from enforc-
ing any law pertaining to the rates, routes, and services of
commercial air carriers. 44 The second is the General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which prohibits states from
enforcing laws related to product claims against general aviation
will be discussed in passing, general aviation lessors like fixed base operators are
not the primary focus of this article, although we discuss at least one negligent
entrustment case arising from a fixed base operation. In essence, this article is
focusing on the Ford Motor Credit or GMAC's of the aviation world, not Hertz or
Avis.
41 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2006).
42 Id.
4 S. REP. No. 85-1811 (1958).
Aviation is unique among transportation industries in its relation to
the federal government-it is the only one whose operations are
conducted almost wholly within federal jurisdiction, and are subject
to little or no regulation by States or local authorities. Thus, the
federal government bears virtually complete responsibility for the
promotion and supervision of this industry in the public interest.
Id.
- 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2006).
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manufacturers where the claims concern general aviation air-
craft or components older than eighteen years.
GARA should have no impact upon the exposure of commer-
cial aircraft lessors. The ADA, however, arguably could have an
impact if a claim against the lessor related to rates, routes, and
services. But so far there has been no decision that holds that a
suit for wrongful death or personal injury might impact the
rates, routes, or services of an air carrier.
What remains after GARA and the ADA is a vast black hole of
aviation regulation where the forces of implied preemption
reign supreme. Section 44112 has been sucked into this black
hole where the state and federal courts have debated for years
whether Section 44112, either through a field or conflict pre-
emption analysis, precludes any attempt by the states at regulat-
ing the liability of commercial aircraft lessors for air disasters.
Section 44112 purportedly limits a commercial aircraft les-
sor's liability to those instances when the aircraft was "in the ac-
tual possession or control of the lessor, owner, or secured
party."4 6 But meanwhile at the state level, state legislatures have
passed laws regarding aircraft lessor liability, and state courts
have interpreted aviation statutes that address the "operation of
aircraft" as a way to impute a pilot's negligence to the lessor.47
Some state courts have even been bold enough to argue that
state law is not preempted by federal aviation law, despite similar
language in the respective statutes and a detailed history of legis-
lative intent.48 The end result of these different statutes and ju-
dicial interpretations is confusion about how Section 44112
relates to state law, and what this means for the commercial air-
craft lessor.
45 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006).
46 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2006).
4 While not an exhaustive list, here are two examples of state laws that address
lessor liability: N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 251 (McKinney 2009) (New York statute
defining the liability of aircraft owners and exempts those with just a security
interest in an aircraft from liability); MICH. CoMP. LAws SERV. § 259.180a (Lexis
Nexis 2008) (Michigan statute addressing civil liability for the negligent opera-
tion of an aircraft). As will be explained later in this article, the majority of state
court opinions that address aircraft lessor liability base their reasoning on state
laws that focus on the operation of aircraft or who was operating the aircraft. See,
e.g., Storie v. Southfield Leasing Inc., 282 N.W.2d 417 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); see
also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 15-34(20) (2009); 620 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11 (West
2007).
48 See generally Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 723 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999); Storie v. Southfield Leasing, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 417 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979);
Hoebee v. Howe, 97 A.2d 223 (N.H. 1953).
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The fight over whether federal or state law controls the poten-
tial liability of an aircraft lessor does not necessarily end at the
shores of the United States. A foreign aviation disaster necessa-
rily means that an American court will need to conduct the ap-
propriate choice of law analysis which could result in the law of
the foreign nation applying to the lawsuit, including its law, if
any, on the liability of the aircraft lessor for the deaths or inju-
ries arising from the crash. The foreign law could specify that
the lessor has vicarious liability for the negligence of the airline,
or that it could be liable for negligently entrusting the aircraft to
the airline, or that it is strictly liable for defect of design or man-
ufacture. If these laws conflict with Section 44112 the American
court will have to determine if Section 44112 reflects a strong
public policy of the United States, thus precluding the applica-
tion of the law of the foreign nation.
Even if it reflects the public policy of the United States, Sec-
tion 44112 could itself be preempted if there is a conflicting
provision in an applicable bilateral or multilateral treaty be-
tween the United States and the nation where the foreign air
disaster occurred. A prudent practitioner would be well advised
to determine if there is an applicable treaty and then analyze it
to verify that no provision might preempt either the law of the
United States or the law of the situs of the foreign air disaster.
So, the answer to Is Lessor More? depends upon a number of
issues. Does naming the aircraft lessor as defendant invariably
result in the denial of a motion to dismiss that otherwise would
have been granted under the forum non conveniens doctrine?
Does Section 44112 preempt state law that would otherwise al-
low a damage recovery from an aircraft lessor?49 Does Section
44112 provide absolute immunity to commercial aircraft lessors,
or is the scope of Section 44112 limited? Is negligent entrust-
ment within the preemption scope of Section 44112? Could
Section 44112 itself be preempted by the law of a foreign nation
or treaty? Is the lawsuit removable from state court to federal
court? Are there other deep-pocket American defendants avail-
able in the forum? These and other factors will have an impact
upon the exposure of an aircraft lessor.
Before we reach the rather complex issue of whether Section
44112 preempts state or foreign laws addressing aircraft lessor
See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 6:2-7 (West 2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 251 (McKin-
ney 2004). These state statutes appear to create absolute liability for the owner of
an aircraft, irrespective of whether the lessor has control or possession.
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liability exposure, it would be helpful to review the legislative
history of Section 44112. We then will discuss the theories of
liability that might be pursued against lessors. Some theories,
depending upon the scope of the federal statute, could arguably
be preempted by Section 44112, but other theories could poten-
tially survive a preemption attack.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 44112
PROVIDES SOME GUIDANCE AS TO THE INTENDED
SCOPE OF THE FEDERALLY MANDATED IMMUNITY
AGAINST LESSOR LIABILITY
The language of Section 44112 is limited. The statute clearly
identifies instances where an aircraft lessor, owner or secured
party should not be liable. But did Congress intend to com-
pletely exonerate lessors from liability? State and federal courts
have interpreted the scope of Section 44112 differently, leaving
a series of confusing and somewhat contradictory holdings in
their wake.
By looking at the plain language of Section 44112 and its leg-
islative history, it is obvious that an argument exists that Con-
gress intended to preempt state law imposing liability upon
owners and lessors of aircraft, at least when certain conditions
are met. As set forth above, Section 44112 states in part:
A lessor, owner, or secured party is liable for personal injury,
death, or property loss or damage on land or water only when a
civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller is in the actual posses-
sion or control of the lessor, owner, or secured party, and the
personal injury, death, or property loss or damage occurs be-
cause of-(1) the aircraft, engine, or propeller; or (2) the flight
of, or an object falling from, the aircraft, engine, or propeller."o
In Section 44112, Congress defined those parties whose civil
liability could be limited by this section.-" One qualifies as a
lessor when he leases an aircraft for at least thirty days. Other-
wise, one is considered either an owner or a secured party."
For example, Smith Aircraft Leasing Corp. is an owner if it
purchases a Boeing 737. If Smith Aircraft Leasing Corp. leases
that same 737 to Fictional-Airline for three years, Smith Aircraft
50 § 44112(b).
51 § 44112(a).
52 As we will discuss later, the distinction between lessor and owner has been
blurred by the courts and is important in determining whether or not a party is
liable in a civil action.
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Corp. is both an owner and a lessor. In a situation where Fic-
tional-Airline purchases a 737 but arranges the financing for
that purchase via Smith Aircraft Leasing Corp., Fictional-Airline
is the owner and Smith Aircraft Leasing Corp. is the secured
party.5 3
A lessor, owner, or secured party is only liable when (1) the
aircraft is in the actual possession or control of such party; (2) the
injury was caused by the aircraft or the flight of the aircraft; and
(3) the personal injury, death, or property loss or damage oc-
curred "on land or water."5  With this statutory language, Con-
gress has expressed its intent as to when and how a lessor can or
cannot be liable for personal injury, death, or property damage.
As the district court said in 2001 in the In re Lawrence W. Inlow
Accident Litigation, "[t] he plain language of § 44112 establishes
that it preempts state common law claims against covered
lessors."5 5
Section 44112 was passed in July of 1994 when Congress re-
codified the Transportation Code in Public Law No. 103-272.6
The statute is deemed part of the FAA Act of 1958.5' The pur-
pose of Public Law No. 103-272 was "to revise, codify, and enact
without substantive change certain general and permanent laws,
related to transportation, as subtitles II, III, and V-X of title 49,
53 § 44112 (a) (3).
To illustrate the classic finance lease transaction, assume that an
airline selects a 747 and negotiates over its particular configuration
with Boeing. Instead of purchasing the 747, the airline then ar-
ranges for a bank to purchase it and for the bank to lease the air-
craft to the airline. Although the document between the bank and
the airline would be a true lease and not a security agreement, this
transaction between the airline and the bank is first and last a fi-
nancing transaction.
Dominguez Mojica v. Citibank, N.A., 853. F. Supp. 51, 54 n.5 (D.P.R. 1994) (quot-
ing 1AJAMEsJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ARTI-
cLE 2A: LEASES OF FOODS 19-20 (3d ed. 1991)).
54 § 44112(b) (emphasis added). Section 44112(b) states that the lessor is lia-
ble for injury/damage "on land or water only." Id. However, this should not be
interpreted as restricting Section 44112 to just injury/damage "on land or water
only." When courts have interpreted the difference between Section 44112 and
its predecessor statutes, they have said that Section 44112 is not a substantive
revision to its predecessor and should follow the intent of the original statute.
Coleman v. Windham Aviation, Inc., No. Civ. A. K.C. 2004-0985, 2005 WL
1793907, *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2005).
55 No. IP 99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL 331625, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001).





United States Code, 'Transportation,' and to make other techni-
cal improvements in the Code."5  Prior to the recodification,
Section 44112 was codified as 49 U.S.C. Section 1404"5 (Section
1404) which stated:
Sec. 1404. Limitation of security owner's liability
No person having a security interest in, or security title to, any
civil aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller under a contract of
conditional sale, equipment trust, chattel or corporate mortgage,
or other instrument of similar nature, and no lessor of any such
aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller under a bona fide lease of
thirty days or more, shall be liable by reason of such interest or
title, or by reason of his interest as lessor or owner of the aircraft,
aircraft engine, or propeller so leased, for any injury to or death
of persons, or damage to or loss of property, on the surface of
the earth (whether on land or water) caused by such aircraft,
aircraft engine, or propeller, or by the ascent, descent, or flight
of such aircraft, aircraft engine, or propeller or by the dropping
or falling of an object therefrom, unless such aircraft, aircraft en-
gine, or propeller is in the actual possession or control of such
person at the time of such injury, death, damage, or loss.6 0
Clearly, there is a difference between Section 44112 and its
predecessor, 49 U.S.C. Section 1404, as evidenced by their dif-
fering lengths alone. Interestingly, the language in the original
Section 1404 seems in certain aspects to be broader than its
younger brother. For example, Section 1404 says a lessor is not
liable for any injury to or death of persons occurring because of
the "ascent, descent, or flight of" aircraft in addition to injury or
death occurring "on the surface of the earth (whether on land
or water)." 6' Section 44112 does not refer to "ascent, descent or
flight of' an aircraft.
Because Congress's stated purpose in recodifying the Trans-
portation Code with Public Law No. 103-272 was to revise and
"enact without substantive change" the preexisting law, the
courts interpreting the alleged preemptive effect of Section
44112 have looked to 49 U.S.C. Section 1404 to determine the
proper scope of Section 44112.63 Because Section 1404
58 Id.
59 See In re Inlow, 2001 WL 331625, at *15.
so 49 U.S.C. § 1404 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 4412 (2006)).
61 Id.
62 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2006).
63 See In re Lawrence W. Inlow Accident Litig., No. IP 99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL
331625, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001); Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos.
X07CV044001467S, X07CV044003418S, 2005 WL 3624483, at *2 (Conn. Super.
2010] 79
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
preempts lessors and secured parties from liability for injury and
death, some courts have held that there is no real substantive
difference between the two, and if there is a difference, the
courts should be bound by the legislative intent behind the orig-
inal enactment of Section 140 4 .6'
Some of the dispute over the differences between Section
44112 and Section 1404 revolves around the inclusion of
"owner" in the later enactment.15 As one can see by looking at
Section 1404, the statutory language seems to apply only to per-
sons having a security interest in an aircraft or lessors of aircraft
under a lease of thirty days or more.6 6 Absent from Section
1404 is the term owner, whereas the term clearly shows up in
Section 44112.67 For our purposes, this dispute is not entirely
relevant because we are focusing on the liability of commercial
aircraft lessors. However, the dispute over the inclusion of
owner in Section 44112 is helpful for our analysis since those
cases that address the dispute find that either statute can pre-
empt state law for a secured party and lessor. 8
By looking at the House Report that accompanies Section
1404, we learn that the purpose behind its passage was "to en-
courage such persons to participate in the financing of aircraft
purchases."'6 This history has been relied on in support of argu-
ments that both Section 1404 and Section 44112 preempt state
law liability of lessors and secured parties."o The reasoning is
Ct. Dec. 7, 2005); Coleman v. Windham Aviation, Inc., No. Civ. A. KC. 2004-
0985, 2005 WL 1793907, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 18, 2005).
64 See In re Inlow, 2001 WL 331625, at *14; Mangini, 2005 WL 3624483, at *2;
Coleman, 2005 WL 1793907, at *6.
65 See Mangini, 2005 WL 3624483, at *3-4 (discussing whether § 44112 extends
to all owners of aircraft or just to lessors and secured parties under § 1404); Cole-
man, 2005 WL 1793907, at *2 (discussing whether § 44112 was meant to exempt
aircraft owners from the imposition of vicarious liability under state law).
66 49 U.S.C. § 1404.
67 Compare § 1404 with § 44112.
- See Coleman, 2005 WL 1793907, at *6. While this case does hold that an
aircraft owner could be liable, the court said it "has no difficulty concluding that
Congress passed § 1404 to facilitate the financing of private airplanes by exempt-
ing owner or lessors holding only a security interest in an aircraft from liability
for negligent operation of that aircraft." Id.
69 H.R. REP. No. 80-2091 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836-37; see
Mangini, 2005 WL 3624483, at *3 (reasoning that "' [s]uch persons' refers to both
those retaining a security interest and lessors, i.e., both the financier and
financed").
70 See generally In re Inlow, 2001 WL 331625; Mangini, 2005 WL 3624483.
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that by eliminating the risk of civil liability, persons would be
more willing to finance aircraft purchases.
House Report 2091 provides additional support for the argu-
ment that Section 1404 and Section 44112 are meant to pre-
empt state law:
Provisions of present Federal and State law might be construed
to impose upon persons who are owners of aircraft for security
purposes only, or who are lessors of aircraft, liability for damages
caused by the operation of such aircraft even though they have
no control over the operation of the aircraft. This bill would re-
move this doubt by providing clearly that such persons have no
liability under such circumstances.72
The language "[t] his bill would remove this doubt by provid-
ing clearly that such persons have no liability under such circum-
stances" naturally makes a statement that Section 1404 is meant
to preempt state law liability "under such circumstances."7 ' The
argument in favor of preemption finds additional support in
House Report 2091 in which Congress addressed the effect of
the Uniform Aeronautics Act upon aircraft financing.74 In re-
sponse to the absolute liability effect of Section 4 of the Uniform
Aeronautics Act, the Report stated:
[Section 4] is susceptible of a construction which would impose
liability upon any person registered as owner, even though he
holds title only as security under a mortgage or similar security
instrument or as lessor under an equipment trust. If such inter-
pretation were adopted, the security title holder could become
liable for extensive damages on the surface caused by the opera-
tion of the aircraft. An owner in possession or control of aircraft,
either personally or through an agent, should be liable for dam-
ages caused. A security owner not in possession or control of the
aircraft, however, should not be liable for such damages. This bill
would make it clear that this generally accepted rule applies and
assures the security owner or lessee, that he would not be liable when
he is not in possession or control of the aircraft.
As the above portion states, Section 1404 was intended to pro-
vide that a security owner will not be liable when not in posses-
71 Mangini, 2005 WL 3624483, at *3.
72 H.R. REP. No. 80-2091.
73 Id.
74 The Uniform Aeronautics Act was in force in ten states when § 1404 was
passed in 1948. The effect of those acts was to hold aircraft owners "absolutely
liable" for damage caused by their aircraft. See id.
75 Id. (emphasis added).
2010] 81
82 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [75
sion or control of the aircraft.7 ' The combination of that
quotation with the other portions of Section 1404 evidences a
clear congressional intent for Section 1404 and its recodified
version Section 44112 to preempt at least certain attempts to
hold a lessor or secured party liable for damage caused by an
aircraft, so long as the lessor or secured party is not in control or
actual possession of the aircraft.
But was it the congressional intent to preempt liability of les-
sors arising from their own independent negligence in entrust-
ing an aircraft to someone or something not qualified to
operate the aircraft as an air carrier? And was it the congres-
sional intent to preempt liability for injury or death to passen-
gers of air carriers? House Report 2091 did not, after all, refer
to death or injury to passengers.7 7 The language in House Re-
port 2091 stated that Congress wanted to encourage financing
of aircraft acquisition by limiting the legal liability of lessors "for
extensive damages on the surface caused by the operation of the
aircraft."78
James B. Busey, Administrator of the Department of Trans-
portation, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), did not be-
lieve Section 1404 insulated aircraft lessors from "potential tort
liability."7 9 On May 2, 1991, Busey responded to an inquiry ask-
ing whether, under the statute, an aircraft owner would be re-
sponsible for the "negligent maintenance of an aircraft that had
been leased to an airline."80 Busey stated that the "potential tort
liability of an aircraft owner/lessor is a matter of state law and
does not directly involve the Federal Aviation Administration."8 1
Busey pointed out that the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)
state that "no person may operate a civil aircraft unless it is in an
airworthy condition. The FAR defines the word 'operate' to in-
clude 'use, cause to use or authorize to use aircraft . . . with or
without the right of legal control (as owner, lessee, or
otherwise).'"8
It is important to note that maintenance is not equivalent to




79 Dep't of Transp., Fed. Aviation Admin., Interpretation 1991-27, 1991 WL
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interpretation of Busey was correct in its broadest possible
scope, then Section 44112 would be essentially written out of the
statute books.
III. COULD THE POTENTIAL LEGAL LIABILITY OF A
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT LESSOR UNDER SECTION 44112
DEPEND UPON THE PARTICULAR THEORY ALLEGED
AGAINST THE LESSOR?
Every aviation practitioner knows there are several different
theories of liability that plaintiffs rely on when attempting to
hold an aircraft lessor liable for injuries caused by operation of
the leased aircraft." For example: (1) the common law theory
of bailment which potentially makes the bailor liable if the chat-
tel was defective at the time it was supplied to the bailee (under
some formulations of the bailment doctrine, the operational
negligence of the bailee is imputed to the bailor); (2) the com-
mon law theory of negligent entrustment, which potentially
makes the lessor liable if he unreasonably entrusted the aircraft
to someone or something not competent or qualified to operate
the aircraft; (3) a variation of negligent entrustment known as
"negligent supervision," which could make the lessor liable
when, although at the time of the lease the lessee was initially
competent and qualified, the lessor unreasonably allowed the
83 For the purpose of this article, please recall that we are focusing on the
commercial aircraft lessor that provides financing for aircraft purchases or en-
gages in long-term leases of aircraft to air carriers. While some of the cases that
will be discussed involve an aircraft lessor, in some of these instances the lessor is
a fixed base operator or is an individual who has leased his or her aircraft to a
corporation but still uses the aircraft for his or her own benefit. In some of these
instances, the aircraft lessor has been held liable because he is still in possession
or control of the aircraft. As we review case law in this area, it will be helpful to
remember that not every judge is familiar with the aviation industry. Keeping
this in mind, in the opinions discussed below, courts tend to use owner and lessor
interchangeably. This can be confusing from the commercial aircraft lessor per-
spective because there is obviously a distinct difference between the commercial
lessor and a fixed base operator; namely, the commercial aircraft lessors very
likely do not have actual possession or control of the aircraft. As a legal practi-
tioner, when faced with a case involving a commercial aircraft lessor, it is impor-
tant to explain and distinguish for the court the difference between a
commercial aircraft lessor and a fixed based operator or small time lessor. Sec-
tion 44112 liability limitation is only effective, if it is effective at all, when the
lessor does not have actual possession or control of the aircraft. What can consti-
tute actual possession or control of the aircraft may be different for a fixed base
operator that rents or leases single-engine aircraft than it is for a commercial
aircraft lessor that arranges financing for the purchase of aircraft or engages in
long-term equipment leases.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
lessee to retain possession of the aircraft during the term of the
aircraft lease when the qualifications or competence of the
lessee were deteriorating; (4) statutory schemes that make the
aircraft lessor vicariously liable for the negligence of the lessee;
and (5) various products liability theories, such as strict liability
and breach of warranty, that make the aircraft lessor liable with-
out fault for a defect that existed in the aircraft at the time of
the lease.
The treatment of each theory may not necessarily be the same
under Section 44112. The cases addressing preemption under
Section 44112 have not specifically settled whether the potential
legal liability of an aircraft lessor may differ according to the
theory being pursued.
The theory of liability implicating commercial aircraft lessors
that has received the most attention is negligent entrustment.
But negligent entrustment is distinct from vicarious negligence,
as the former focuses on the alleged independent negligence of
the lessor while the latter focuses on the negligence of the oper-
ator.8 5 And both negligent entrustment and vicarious negli-
gence are distinct from the traditional product claims of strict
liability and breach of warranty, which, of course, focus on a de-
sign or manufacturing defect of an aircraft. A different public
policy underlies each of these theories of liability. Some of
these public policies could be consistent with the public policy
underlying Section 44112, thus allowing those theories to avoid
preemption.
84 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2009); see Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 472
(9th Cir. 2007) (noting that 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 acts as "a general federal standard
of care").
85 Thad T. Dameris, T. Craig Wagner, & David J. Weiner, Apportioning Liability
Between the Commercial Aircraft User and the Commercial Aircraft Manufacturer, in LITI-
GATING THE AVIATION CASE: FROM PRE-TRIL TO CLOSING ARGUMENTS 93, 94 (An-
drew J. Harakas ed., 3d ed. 2008); Dudley v. Bus. Express, Inc., No. 93-581-SD,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18426, at *13-14 (D.N.H. Dec. 20, 1994) (addressing the
plaintiffs negligence claims and relying on section 408 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts to determine that a chattel lessor is subject to liability "if the lessor
fails to exercise reasonable care to make it safe for such use or to disclose its
actual condition to those who may be expected to use it"). After looking at the
relationship between the defendant finance lessor and the aircraft, the court
held in Dudley that the defendant finance lessor could not be liable for negli-
gence because there was no proof that the lessor breached a duty of care owed to
the plaintiffs-"At no time did either [defendant] have possession of the aircraft,
nor did they participate to any degree in the design, maintenance, manufacture,




Recall that under Section 44112 the lessor or secured party is
liable when the aircraft is in the actual possession or control of
the lessor, owner, or secured party." Is the scope of possession
or control broad enough to preclude liability for negligent en-
trustment and negligent supervision as well as vicarious negli-
gence? We should note that by definition the lessor did have
either possession or control at the time he entrusted the aircraft
to the operator.
On the other hand, the lessor would not have possession or
control after entrusting the aircraft to the lessee. But a negli-
gent supervision claim might still be viable under the control or
possession standard of Section 44112 if a court were to construe
the termination and default provisions in the lease as providing
the lessor with the control to recover possession if the lessee had
become incompetent to operate the aircraft safely.
Under Abdullah, it is federal law that sets the standard of care
for air safety.87 If there is no standard established under federal
law for negligent entrustment, should such a claim be pre-
empted under a field preemption theory even though negligent
entrustment might otherwise be outside the preemption scope
of Section 44112? Should a recovery for negligent entrustment
be considered a remedy and hence not preempted under the
FAA Act of 1958?
Does Section 44112 reach product claims? The language
"possession or control" suggests the statute was intended to
reach only vicarious negligence claims, not product claims aris-
ing out of the chain of distribution. The defective product, in
this case an aircraft, would have been in the possession or con-
trol of the lessor at the time the lease was made.
A. VicAIUous LIABILITY
More than sixty years ago the Uniform Aeronautics Act was in
force in at least ten states." Section 4 of the Act made aircraft
owners absolutely liable for losses arising from use of the air-
craft.89 There are still states that statutorily, or by common law,
impose vicarious liability upon the owners and lessors of air-
86 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2008).
87 See Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999).
88 Anthony F. Walsh, Post 9/11 Aircraft Liability Issues Revisited, ELT MAG., Nov./
Dec. 2001, at 14, 16.
89 Id.
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craft."o Some courts have imposed a variation of vicarious liabil-
ity when the lessor has entrusted an aircraft to a lessee, when at
the time of entrustment the aircraft either had a defect or main-
tenance shortcoming." In some of these cases the underlying
legal theory has either been based on the common law of bail-
ment or the violation of a state or federal statute for operational
negligence.9 2 Arguably, the current trend is to not find the air-
craft owner vicariously liable for the independent acts of a third
party.9 3
We should recall that when enacting Section 1404 in 1948,
the House of Representatives in House Report 2091 noted that a
reason for passing the legislation was to reverse the adverse im-
pact the Uniform Aeronautics Act had on aircraft financing.94
Does this mean that Section 1404 was intended to completely
preempt all state law vicarious liability exposure to long term
aircraft lessors?
Some cases have reasoned that the foundation for a vicarious
liability claim against the aircraft lessor comes from provisions
90 See Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir.
1970). Three of the most cited cases from this period are Hays v. Morgan, 221
F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955), Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 85 N.W.2d 622 (Iowa 1957), and
Hoebee v. Howe, 97 A.2d 223 (N.H. 1953). All three cases determined that the
lessor could be liable for the pilot's negligence. Hoebee and Hays each dealt with
the vicarious liability of the owner, whereas Lamasters was looking at negligent
entrustment. Hays, 221 F.2d at 482-83; Lamasters, 85 N.W.2d at 626; Hoebee, 97
A.2d at 225. What is interesting about Hays and Lamasters is that both deter-
mined that a previous incarnation of Section 44112 would preempt liability if its
requirements were fulfilled. Hays, 221 F.2d at 482; Lamasters, 85 N.W.2d at 625.
Hoebee, Hays, and Lamasters have received disparate treatment; one example is the
Fifth Circuit's rejection of the reasoning of those cases in Rogers v. Ray Gardner
Flying Service, Inc., 35 F.2d at 1394 (Rogers is particularly helpful since it is re-
jecting its prior holding in Hays). However, the Mississippi Supreme Court in
Malone v. Capital Correctional Resources, Inc., recently affirmed Hays and allowed an
aircraft owner to be vicariously liable. Malone, 808 So.2d 963, 966 (Miss. 2002).
The validity of the Malone holding is questionable since the majority opinion
based its reasoning by distinguishing itself from the federal district court opinion
in Astron (a 1997 N.D. Ala. decision that refused to impute liability to the owner
of an aircraft for the pilot's negligence) but made no direct reference to the Fifth
Circuit decision in Rogers. See Malone, 808 So.2d 963. But see id. at 970-71 (Smith,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91 See Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos. X07CV044001467S,
X07CV044003418S, 2005 WL 3624483 at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005).
92 See Brown v. Astron Enterps., 989 F. Supp. 1399, 1405-06 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
93 Id. at 1408; Rosdail v. W. Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 684-87 (D. Colo.
1967). Contra Malone, 808 So.2d at 966; Coleman v. Windham Aviation Inc., No.
Civ. A. K.C. 2004-0985, 2005 WL 1793907, at *6 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2005).
94 H.R. REP. No. 80-2091 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836-37.
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of the FAA Act of 1958 dealing with the operation of an air-
craft. 5 The theory is that the aircraft owner or lessor could be
vicariously liable under a common-law bailment theory because
the lessor (bailor) caused or authorized the negligent operation
of an aircraft by the bailee. 6
But through the present date the federal courts that have
looked at the potential vicarious liability of an aircraft lessor
have not read federal law to impute liability absent negligence
by the lessor.17 But is this a correct interpretation of the FAA
Act of 1958?
Under Abdullah, federal law sets the standard of care for air-
craft operations." The general standard of care required in the
operation of an aircraft can be found in 14 C.F.R. Section 91.13:
Section 91.13 Careless or reckless operation.
(a) Aircraft operations for the purpose of air navigation. No per-
son may operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as
to endanger the life or property of another.
(b) Aircraft operations other than for the purpose of air naviga-
tion. No person may operate an aircraft, other than for the pur-
pose of air navigation, on any part of the surface of an airport
used by aircraft for air commerce (including areas used by those
aircraft for receiving or discharging persons or cargo), in a care-
less or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of
another.99
5 See McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129, 1129-30 (10th Cir.
1971); Hays, 221 F.2d at 482.
96 See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 128 (2008).
9 See Sanz v. Renton Aviation, Inc., 511 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1975); Mc-
Cord, 450 F. Supp. at 1130 (declining to imply a civil remedy under the FAA Act
of 1958 absent an actual violation of the FAA Act of 1958 or any proof that the
airplane was rented in an unsafe condition or other circumstance); Rosdail, 297
F. Supp. at 684-85; Broadway v. Webb, 462 F. Supp. 429, 433-34 (W.D.N.C.
1977); 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 127, stating that:
a provision of the Federal Aviation Act, under which one who
causes or authorizes the operation of an aircraft, with or without
the right of legal control, is regarded as operating such aircraft,
does not afford a basis under federal law for vicarious liability, or
for imputing a pilot's negligence to the owner of an aircraft.
98 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
- 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 (2009); see Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 371 (stating in determin-
ing the standards of care in an aviation negligence action, a court must refer not
only to specific regulations but also to the overall concept that aircraft may not be
operated in a careless or reckless manner. The applicable standard of care is not
limited to a particular regulation of a specific area; it expands to encompass the
issue of whether the overall operation or conduct in question was careless or
reckless.).
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Thus, according to 14 C.F.R. Section 91.13, no person may
operate an aircraft in a "careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another." 00 It is important to
recall, however, that the FAR, as already noted in the Legal In-
tepretation of Administrator James B. Busey, defines the term
operate to include "use, cause to use or authorize to use aircraft
. . . with or without the right of legal control (as owner, lessee, or
otherwise)." 101
Does this mean that federal law has already established a stan-
dard of care applicable to aircraft lessors that imposes vicarious
liability? Are the elements of this claim only the following: (1)
the careless or reckless operation of an aircraft by an air carrier
and (2) whether the lessor authorized the air carrier to fly the
aircraft?
Naturally, if such a federal standard of care does exist, al-
though not previously recognized, it would have to be harmo-
nized with Section 44112. In other words, does federal law
impose vicarious liability upon a lessor subject only to the excep-
tions, if any, set out in Section 44112?
But should such a potential federal standard of vicarious lia-
bility, if it exists, be applicable to finance lessors?10 2 It should be
difficult to hold the finance lessor vicariously liable because a
finance lessor likely never had actual possession or control of
the aircraft."0 '
The commercial lessor that leases an aircraft for less than
thirty days faces the greatest exposure to vicarious liability since
it is accorded no protection under Section 44112. A recent ex-
ample of when a commercial lessor was liable despite Section
44112 was seen in Coleman v. Windham Aviation, Inc.I0 4 The rea-
soning for permitting vicarious liability was that the lessor was
the actual owner of the aircraft involved in the accident, so Sec-
tion 44112 did not preempt.10
1oo 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(b).
]0 See Fed. Aviation Admin., supra note 79.
102 McCord, 450 F.2d at 1130; see In re Lawrence W. Inlow Accident Litig., No. IP
99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL 331625, at *14 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Rosdail, 297 F. Supp. at
684-85; Brown v. Astron Enterps., Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1399, 1408 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
103 See Dudley v. Bus. Express, Inc., No. 93-581-SD, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18426, at *13-14 (D.N.H. Dec. 20, 1994).
104 See generally Coleman, No. Civ. A.K.C. 2004-0985, 2005 WL 1793907 (R.I.
Super. Ct. 2005).
105 Id. at *6. One problem with the Coleman case is that the court applied a
Rhode Island law that imposed vicarious liability on aircraft owners for the negli-




An allegation of negligent entrustment by a plaintiff against
the lessor is based on the common law of bailment and is essen-
tially an allegation that the lessor knew or should have known
that the lessee aircraft operator was not competent to safely op-
erate the aircraft. 10 6 A negligent entrustment claim is different
from a vicarious liability claim because the plaintiff is trying to
prove that the lessor itself was negligent, as opposed to being
automatically liable for another's negligent conduct. While fed-
eral courts have been hesitant to hold that the FAA Act of 1958
imposes vicarious liability on an aircraft owner for the negli-
gence of the operator, they have allowed negligent entrustment
claims to go forward.10
Attempting to hold a lessor liable for negligent entrustment is
an interesting theory of liability because of the different ele-
ments the plaintiff must prove in order for a lessor to be lia-
ble. 0 8 The standard for negligent entrustment is based on
section 390 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Section 390. Chattel For Use By Person Known To Be
Incompetent
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to
know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or other-
wise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical
harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to
in the opinion on whether such laws would be preempted under Abdullah and
earlier decisions that suggest no vicarious liability.
106 SeeJoy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Nos. 88-2165, 88-2351, 88-2352, 88-
3012, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1990) (stating "[t]he
tort of negligent entrustment provides a remedy against those who negligently
entrust a chattel to another whose foreseeable negligent use of the chattel causes
injury").
107 Sanz v. Renton Aviation, Inc., 511 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding
that, while the Federal Aviation Act was not meant to make non-negligent aircraft
owners "civilly responsible for pilot-lessee negligence," "[i]f the owner negli-
gently entrusts the aircraft, that is another matter").
108 Charles Krause & Kent Krause, Bailor's or Lessor's Liability for Negligence with
Respect to Condition, Maintenance, etc., of Aircraft-Negligent Entrustment, 2 AVIATION
TORT AND REG. LAw § 14:8 (2009) ("A bailor or lessor that entrusts a small air-
plane, etc., to a bailee pilot that the bailor either knows or should have known
was incompetent to operate the aircraft, or reckless, may be held liable for injury,
death or property damage caused by operational negligence of the bailee
pilot.").
2010] 89
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for
physical harm resulting to them."o'
While section 390 provides the basic standard, some states, like
California, have their own standard for negligent entrustment
and determining the actual standard of one's own state is worth
investigating.' 10
The basic test for negligent entrustment is whether the owner
or lessor knew or should have known that the bailee was incom-
petent, inexperienced, reckless, or had dangerous propensi-
ties."'1 This is based on an ordinary prudent person in like
circumstances or if the lessor exercised ordinary care in making
this determination.1 1 2 In some instances, there must be a deter-
mination if the harm was foreseeable. 1 3
If a supplier of a chattel is aware of facts which establish that an
individual lacks the ability to safely use the chattel for a particular
purpose, and the supplier nevertheless entrusts the chattel to
that individual to use for that purpose, the supplier has acted im-
prudently and should be held accountable if harm arises from
the individual's inadequacy.114
oo RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965); see joy, 1990 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 17185, at *5 (applying section 390 because "it is widely known and applied
in other jurisdictions"); see also Zetter v. Griffith Aviation, Inc., No. 6:03-218-DCR,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23192, at *42-43 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 2006) (choosing to
apply section 390).
no See Zetter, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23191, at *42 (refusing to apply the specific "neg-
ligent entrustment of aircraft" standard from Anderson Aviation v. Perez, 508 P.2d
87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973)); White v. Inbound Aviation, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 71, 77 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1999) (applying the California standard for negligent entrustment but
indicating that section 390 is similar); Pincura v. Forbes, No. 56854, 1990 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1375, *6--7 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 5, 1990) (applying the Ohio stan-
dard for negligent entrustment).
11 See White, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77 (quoting joy that
'[i]n its simplest form the question is whether the owner [or other
supplier] when he permits an incompetent or reckless person,
whom he knows to be incompetent or reckless, to take and operate
his car [or any other instrumentality], acts as an ordinary prudent
person would be expected to act under the circumstances.' Califor-
nia courts have long held that inexperience alone does not necessa-
rily establish incompetency.
Joy, 1990 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17185, at *7 (highlighting that two main features of
negligent entrustment are "the knowledge of the supplier concerning the dan-
gerous propensities of the entrustee and in the forseeability of harm")); see also
Pincura,1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1375, at *6-7.
112 joy, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *7.
11 Id.
114 White, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77.
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A lessor is in a quandary when it leases to an airline that is
fully certificated but nevertheless is on the E.U. Blacklist or is
from a nation that has been downgraded to Class 2. The certifi-
cation, as impliedly suggested in White below, is probably not a
full shield to negligent entrustment claims. A certification may
be only a minimum standard. An adverse safety history of the
lessee may still create a triable issue of negligent entrustment
notwithstanding the fact that the air carrier holds a current op-
erating certificate. The lessor should have ready access to infor-
mation regarding the airline's safety records. Sources include,
but would not be limited to, the Aviation Safety Network, the
Airclaims database, and the lessor's presumed ability, although
arguably impracticable, to inspect and audit an air carrier
before entering into a lease.
Both large and small aircraft lessors have been found liable
for negligent entrustment. In White v. Inbound Aviation, the
fixed base operator, Inbound Aviation, was sued for negligent
entrustment by the parents of a pilot who had rented a Piper
Archer from the operator."' The Piper was owned by Jeffrey
Marconet, who leased it to Inbound." 6 Besides being the owner
and lessor, Marconet was also a manager and employee of In-
bound."' The young pilot had about seventy-five hours of flight
time, twenty-three of which were solo."18 The pilot had rented
from Inbound before and had previously completed a non-high
altitude check ride with an Inbound check pilot." 9 Inbound
Aviation was charged with knowledge of the pilot's skill and ex-
perience in piloting an airplane.1 2 0
The fixed base operator in White required pilots to pass a high
altitude check ride before they could rent an aircraft to fly to a
high altitude airport.1 2 1 The pilot knew about the check-out re-
quirement, but had never completed a high altitude check ride
with Inbound.1 2 2 The lack of a high altitude check ride was
noted in the pilot's file at Inbound Aviation.1 2 3 The pilot's log
115 Id. at 74-76.
116 Id. at 74.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 75.
119 Id.
120 See id. at 73-76.
121 Id. at 73.
122 Id. at 75.
123 Id.
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did indicate that he had flown into high altitude airports before,
just never with one of Inbound's aircraft. 2 4
On the day of the accident, the pilot rented the Piper from
Inbound Aviation, and Inbound knew the pilot intended to fly
to a high altitude airport, even though he had not been checked
out to fly to such a location.1 2' The pilot later crashed while on
takeoff from a high altitude airport.12 6
At issue in the case was whether Inbound negligently en-
trusted the aircraft to the pilot when it knew or should have
known the pilot was arguably not competent to operate the air-
craft in and out of high altitude airports.127 Significantly, there
was no dispute that the pilot was properly certificated by the
FAA to operate the Piper as pilot-in-command.'"2 There were
no applicable limitations upon the pilot's airman certificate.12 9
Not unreasonably, Inbound Aviation argued it could not be lia-
ble for negligent entrustment as a matter of law because the
FAA certificated the pilot as competent to fly the aircraft without
limitation.13 0
The court found that being properly certificated by the FAA is
not an absolute defense to a claim for negligent entrustment.13 1
The court explained that Inbound Aviation could be liable for
negligent entrustment because a reasonable jury could have
concluded that the pilot was incompetent to fly into high alti-
tude airports because he had never taken the high altitude
check ride, and Inbound knowingly permitted a pilot with ques-
tionable skills and no high altitude experience to rent one of its
airplanes and fly to a high altitude airport.1 12
In other words, it appears the California court determined
that being properly certificated by the FAA is simply a minimum
standard. Circumstances known to the owner or lessor of the
aircraft could and do create triable issues of fact over whether
the lessor acted reasonably in allowing a pilot to take possession




127 Id. at 76.
128 Id. at 77.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 78.
132 Id.
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There was no argument in White that Section 44112 should
have been applicable. The case therefore is not helpful to our
preemption analysis. The reasoning in White is instructive, how-
ever, for other reasons.
The holding in White, although that case dealt with a rental by
a fixed base operator, suggests that a commercial aircraft lessor
may not find immunity against negligent entrustment by argu-
ing the air carrier is properly certificated under the regulations
of the controlling jurisdiction. Thus, under the reasoning in
White the status of an air carrier on the E.U. Blacklist or the
FAA's Class 2 could be particularly relevant in a negligent en-
trustment claim.
A commercial aircraft lessor, not a fixed-base operator, was a
defendant in Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.' In Joy, a negli-
gent entrustment claim against the commercial aircraft lessor
was allowed to proceed beyond a summary judgment claim.1s4
Once again, however, there is no analysis of Section 44112, and
the case should not be considered precedent on the potential
preemptive effect of the federal statute.
The lessor in Joy was a company called Advest which had pur-
chased a helicopter it then leased to the operator for sixty
months.1 3 5 Advest was essentially acting as a finance lessor. 3 1
Advest retained the right to repossess the helicopter under cer-
tain conditions, like late lease payments or lapse in insurance."
As part of the lease, the operator had to abide by all FARs and
was responsible for obtaining hull and liability insurance.1 3 s In
event of a lapse in insurance, the operator was to notify the
lessor. 139
Shortly after taking possession of the helicopter, the operator
missed several lease payments and its insurance policies were
canceled for non-payment. 40 In response, Advest acted to re-
possess the helicopter.' 4 ' An Advest representative personally
informed the operator that the lease was terminated and re-
133 Nos. 88-2165, 88-2351, 88-2352, 88-3012, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *1
(D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1990).
134 Id. at *9-10.
"3 Id. at *1-2.
136 Id. at *10.
137 Id. at *2-3.
138 Id. at *2.
13 Id.
140 Id. at *2-3.
141 Id. *3.
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moved the maintenance logs from the helicopter."'2 The lessee
gave Advest verbal confirmation that it knew it was against FARs
to fly without the maintenance logs and promised not to use the
helicopter.14 3 At the time of repossession, the lessee told the
lessor that the helicopter needed a new oil filter.1 4 4 However,
the lessee broke its promise to the lessor and used the air-
craft.14 5 It crashed, killing the passengers on board. 1 4 6 The
plaintiffs brought suit against the lessor, one of the claims being
negligent entrustment.14 7
In evaluating the negligent entrustment claim, the court
looked to see if the lessor knew that the lessee had dangerous
propensities.'14  The court determined the plaintiff could show
that the lessor had knowledge that the lessee had a "propensity
to operate the helicopter in an irresponsible manner"'49 be-
cause the lessor knew the lessee had been behind in lease pay-
ments, thus "evincing a reckless disregard of its financial
obligations."o5 0 Since the lessee told the lessor at the time of
repossession that the helicopter needed a new oil filter, the les-
sor had actual knowledge that the lessee was not properly main-
taining the helicopter.' 5 ' Lastly, the lessor knew that the lessee's
insurance policies for the helicopter had lapsed.1 5 2 By looking
at the cumulative effect of this evidence, the court determined
that the plaintiff had sufficiently shown that the lessee "had a
propensity to use the helicopter in a dangerous manner, and
that Advest [the lessor] knew or should have known of this
likelihood." 5 3
The lessor argued that there was not an entrustment because
it had repossessed the aircraft.154 Yet, the aircraft remained in
the lessee's physical possession because the lessor left it on the
lessee's property, and the lessee had the keys.'55 Besides taking
142 Id.
143 Id.
-" Id. at *4.
145 Id.
146 Id. at *1-4.
147 Id. at *5-10.





15s Id. at *7-8.
154 Id. at *8.
155 Id.
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the maintenance log and eliciting a promise that the aircraft
would not be flown, the lessor never made any additional efforts
to ensure that the aircraft would not be flown. 1 5 6 The court de-
termined that, because the aircraft remained in the lessee's pos-
session and the lessor "failed to effectively exercise" its right to
prohibit the lessee's use of the helicopter, a reasonable jury
could find that an entrustment occurred.' joy is interesting be-
cause the court allowed the negligent entrustment claim to
stand, yet it dismissed a vicarious liability claim against the
lessor. 5 8
The Joy case presents a dilemma for the commercial aircraft
lessor. Although the court did not address Section 44112 pre-
emption, it is difficult to determine if Section 44112 would pre-
empt here. Under Section 44112, there is arguably no liability
should the lessor not be in actual possession or control of the
aircraft. Here, the court found an entrustment occurred once
the lessor acted to repossess the aircraft but the lessee still re-
tained possession of the helicopter.'5 ' Because the lessee still
retained possession, then under Section 44112, the lessor did
not have actual possession. 6 0 However, Section 44112 also
looks at control of the aircraft. '6 Whether or not the lessor had
control of the aircraft is difficult to determine. Because the les-
sor took the maintenance logs, it arguably was in control of the
aircraft since flying without the logs would have violated federal
regulations.16 2
From joy and White, we have learned that a court can hold the
lessor liable under a negligent entrustment theory when the les-
sor knows that the lessee is not competent to safely operate the
aircraft or has a propensity to use the aircraft in a dangerous
manner even though the operator may otherwise be properly
certificated.' For the large scale commercial lessor, the rea-
soning in joy could act to broaden its liability exposure, as it
seems an aircraft lessor could potentially become liable for neg-
ligent entrustment should the lessee fall behind in lease pay-
156 Id. at *8-9.
157 Id.
158 Id. at *13 (citing Sanz v Renton Aviation, Inc., 511 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir.
1975)).
159 Id. at *8-9.
1 - Id.
16! 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2006).
162 See Joy, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *3.
163 See id. at *7; White v. Inbound Aviation, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 71, 78 (Ct. App.
1999).
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ments or fail to acquire insurance, in addition to failing to
maintain the aircraft properly. 164
As phrased in White, "[tlhe information available to the sup-
plier about the individual and his or her purpose in obtaining
the chattel determines whether the supplier acts imprudently in
supplying the chattel."'6 5 In analyzing the negligent entrust-
ment issue, Joy sought "'significantly probative' evidence" that
the lessor knew that the lessee had the "propensity to operate
the helicopter in an irresponsible manner. "166 The court in joy
implied, if it did not state outright, that there is a somewhat re-
markably low threshold for knowledge that creates a jury issue
on whether the lessor was negligent in entrusting the aircraft to
the operator.16 1
From joy we see that knowledge can be satisfied by financial
violations of the lease agreement.'6 It might surprise some that
financial difficulties of a lessee could place a lessor on notice
that the air carrier might be incompetent to operate or main-
tain an aircraft. But, upon reflection, we should remember that
the Department of Transportation links financial stability with
suitability to maintain scheduled air carrier operations. 6 9 Un-
less an air carrier makes a sufficient demonstration that it has
adequate financial resources, the Department of Transportation
will not issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity.7 o
Does the potential liability of a lessor extend to negligent su-
pervision? A lessor is charged with information that it actually
possesses but is also charged with information it should have
known. Is the lessor thus charged with knowledge of facts that a
reasonable investigation would have disclosed? Do provisions in
the lease allowing the lessor to audit and investigate the opera-
tions of the air carrier and terminate the lease constructively im-
pute knowledge of the air carrier's operations? Do such lease
164 See Joy, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *7.
165 White, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78.
166 joy, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *7.
167 See id. at *7-8; see also White, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78 (stating "it is necessarily a
question for the jury whether a prudent person, aware of the facts known to the
supplier of the instrumentality, would have permitted the individual to operate
the instrumentality.").
168 Examples from joy of how the lease agreement was used to fulfill the knowl-
edge element include lessee being late in lease payments, requirement to obtain
insurance, and notice when there is a lapse in insurance coverage. Joy, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18185, at *2-3, *7.
169 See 49 U.S.C. § 41102 (2006); 14 C.F.R. § 204.3 (2009).
170 49 U.S.C. § 41102; 14 C.F.R. § 204.3.
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provisions create liability for negligent supervision under cir-
cumstances where the operator was competent and qualified at
the time of initial entrustment of the aircraft but then, over the
life of the aircraft lease, the financial condition of the operator
deteriorated?
C. PRODUcrs LIABILITY
The theory of products liability creates an interesting conun-
drum for both the commercial aircraft lessor and the plaintiff.
Whether or not an aircraft lessor can be liable under a theory of
strict products liability for an injury caused by a leased aircraft
depends on the relationship between the aircraft lessor and the
aircraft itself. If the lessor only provided the financing, that is, is
a finance lessor, and never had possession of the aircraft, then it
is likely there is no strict products liability exposure for the air-
craft lessor.171 However, if the lessor did have possession of the
aircraft, a strict products liability claim might be successful, de-
pending on the facts of the situation.172 The distinction as to
when a lessor can or cannot be held strictly liable depends on
whether the lessor is considered a finance lessor or commercial
lessor under the Uniform Commercial Code and applicable laws
for the aircraft at issue.
Before delving into a discussion about the aircraft lessor and a
strict products liability claim, it will be helpful to provide a little
background information about strict product liability claims. As
experienced practitioners know well, unlike a negligence claim,
a strict products liability claim does not require proof of fault,
only defect.173 Under strict products liability, the plaintiff will
be alleging that the lessor placed a defective aircraft into the
stream of commerce.1 74
171 See Dudley v. Bus. Express, Inc., No. 93-581-SD, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18426, at *12, *18 (D.N.H. Dec. 20, 1994) (holding that a finance lessor cannot
be liable to a third party for an injury that occurred on the lessee's aircraft be-
cause the lessor was never in possession of the aircraft).
172 See id. at *15-16.
173 Dameris et al., supra note 85, at 96.
174 See id.
In order to prevail on a strict liability claim, the aircraft user must
establish that the manufacturer placed a defective aircraft into the
stream of commerce, that the aircraft was in a defective condition
that was unreasonably dangerous to consumers, and that the seller
was in the business of selling the product.
Id.
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Most strict liability claims are governed by section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.17 5 Such claims can be based
upon "a failure to warn or provide adequate instructions." 7 6
One could argue that an aircraft lessor failed to warn or ade-
quately instruct the lessee on nuances regarding a particular air-
craft.1 77 Compliance with federal regulations is not an adequate
defense against a strict liability claim."1 7  Liability under a strict
products liability theory is not just limited to the purchaser, but
it can extend to third parties like passengers on the aircraft.179
Because third parties can utilize a strict products liability theory,
it can be attractive to the plaintiff passenger.
A commercial lessor can be subject to strict products liability
because, by renting or leasing a product, it is akin to the seller of
a product who puts a defective good into the stream of com-
merce.1o The commercial lessor "is someone who rents a prod-
uct to its customer for a relatively short period, with the
expectation that the product will be returned at the completion
of the term of the lease and, perhaps, then leased to other, fu-
ture customers."' Lessors who take on the commercial lessor
role may be held strictly liable for the defective products they
rent. 182
On the other hand, a finance lessor is more of a middle-man
in the transaction, existing between the supplier and purchaser.
The finance lessor "does not actually provide the equipment to
the lessee, but rather provides the money which allows the user
of already selected equipment to purchase it."' The finance
lessor does not help in the selection, production, or marketing




177 Id. at 96-97.
178 Id. at 97 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 578 (W.D.
Okla. 1979), affd in part and rev'd in part 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981).
179 Id. (citing King v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
180 See Abco Metals Corp. v. J.W. Imports Co., 560 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (citing Crowe v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n, 383 N.E.2d 951, 952 (Ill. 1978).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 130-31.
183 Id. at 131.
184 See, e.g., Abco Metals Corp. v. Equico Lessors, Inc., 721 F.2d 583, 585 (7th
Cir. 1983) (describing the role of the financial lessor in the transaction).
[Defendant] had no input into the production or marketing of this
machine. It was not, therefore, in the original chain of distribution
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To illustrate the classic finance lease transaction, assume that an
airline selects a 747 and negotiates over its particular configura-
tion with Boeing. Instead of purchasing the 747, the airline then
arranges for a bank to purchase it and for the bank to lease the
aircraft to the airline. Although the document between the bank
and the airline would be a true lease and not a security agree-
ment, this transaction between the airline and the bank is first
and last a financing transaction. 1 5
The finance lessor, because it does not actually design, manufac-
ture, or distribute the product, is not introducing the aircraft
into the stream of commerce and, thus, should be exempt from
strict products liability.186
The premise of not holding strictly liable an aircraft lessor act-
ing as a finance lessor was seen in Dudley v. Business Express, Inc.,
where a district court in New Hampshire granted summary judg-
ment for an airplane's finance lessor being sued for negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty.' 8 The underlying claim
related to a plaintiff who was injured after striking her head on
the aircraft door frame or fuselage.' The aircraft was a Beech
model 1900D, operated by Business Express.' 8 In addition to
and was not a party capable of preventing a defective product from
entering the stream of commerce. Any profit it reaped derived
from having placed its money, and not the defective product, into
the stream of commerce.
Id.
185 Dominguez Mojica v. Citibank, N.A., 853 F. Supp. 51, 54 n.5 (D.P.R. 1994)
(quoting WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 53, at 19-20).
186 Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., Nos. 88-2165, 88-2351, 88-2352, 88-
3012, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *11 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1990) (finding "per-
suasive those cases which hold that providers of financial leases are not held
strictly liable for defective products"). See Abco Metals Corp., 721 F.2d at 584-86;
Cole v. Elliott Equip. Corp., 653 F.2d 1031, 1032 (5th Cir. 1981); Dominguez
Mojica v. Citibank, N.A., 830 F. Supp. 668, 671-73 (D.P.R. 1993); Nath v. Nat'l
Equip. Leasing Corp., 439 A.2d 633, 634-36 (Pa. 1981).
187 No. 93-581-SD, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18426, at *3, *21-22 (D.N.H., Dec.
20, 1994); see also joy, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *11. But see In re Aircrash
Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, No. 95 C 4593, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13696, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1997) (finding a question of fact whether
AMR Leasing was a commercial lessor and thus subject to strict liability). The
court in In re Aircrash Disaster does not go into detail beyond its conclusion. The
determination is interesting because this case related to the same accident that
was at issue in Retzler v. Pratt &' Whitney Co. While not discussed in Retzler, maybe
the fact that the lessor was a commercial lessor, as opposed to a finance lessor,
contributed to the court's determination that Section 44112 would not preempt
in that case.
188 Dudley, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18426, at *1.
189 Id. at *1, *3.
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Business Express, the plaintiff named Concord Commercial
Corporation (CCC) as a defendant.190 CCC's sole connection to
the aircraft was as a finance lessor, having provided third-party
financing to Business Express and its corporate parent."'
Central to the court's reasoning was that CCC was "not in-
volved in the design, selection, or manufacture of the defective
items and thus [was] not in a position to detect a possibly defec-
tive condition."19 2 In addition, "the imposition of strict liability
on financial lessors would adversely impact the leasing market as
a whole, forcing the lessors to charge enhanced fees so as to
protect themselves from liability claims for defective products
whose condition they are unable to detect and powerless to
correct."1 9 3
Looking at the facts of the case, the court noted that by being
a finance lessor, CCC "lacked 'dominion and control' over the
aircraft" and that the plaintiffs were "unable to prove that CCC
[and other named defendant] were a part of the original chain
of production, marketing, or distribution of the aircraft."1 9 4 By
not being part of the original chain of production, marketing,
or distribution of the aircraft, the finance lessor could not be
involved in the development of the product that would lead to a
defect.'
What is interesting about Dudley is that the case makes no
mention of the role Section 44112 would play in a strict liability
context. Looking back to the discussion on whether Section
44112 can preempt state law, Section 44112 should preempt
state laws that impose strict products liability on the aircraft les-
sor in those situations when the lessor does not have actual pos-
session or control of the aircraft.1 9 6
As seen from the above discussion, whether or not the large
commercial aircraft lessor can be strictly liable may depend on
whether it can be classified as a finance lessor or a commercial
lessor. The distinction between the two depends on the role the
lessor played in relation to the aircraft and the lessee. Should
190 Id. at *1.
191 Id. at *3-4.
192 Id. at *17.
193 Id. at *17-18. This last argument could be used to support the contention
that letting a finance lessor be strictly liable would be expressly preempted by the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
194 Id. at *18.
195 See id.
196 See 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2006).
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the aircraft lessor be acting only as a financial middle-man, and
not participating in the selection, production, or manufacture
of the aircraft, or never exercising dominion and control over
the aircraft, it is more likely that the aircraft lessor is a finance
lessor and is exempt from liability."' However, should the role
of the lessor be more like that of a renter, then it is likely that
the aircraft lessor would be defined as a commercial lessor and
would be exposed to strict products liability. 19 8
Like the aircraft lessor facing a third-party strict liability claim,
the liability exposure of an aircraft lessor facing a breach of war-
ranty claim is based on its role as either a commercial or finance
lessor. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, there are no im-
plied warranties of merchantability or fitness for finance leases,
so a financial lessor who only provides a finance lease cannot be
liable for breach of an implied warranty."' Central to an at-
tempt to bring a breach of implied warranty claim is the classifi-
cation of the lease and the role of the lessor.
IV. THE EXPOSURE OF THE COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT
LESSOR TO PASSENGER PERSONAL INJURY AND
WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS MAY DEPEND NOT ONLY
UPON THE THEORY OF LIABILITY ALLEGED AGAINST
THE LESSOR BUT ALSO UPON THE INTENDED SCOPE
OF SECTION 44112 AND WHETHER STATE, FEDERAL, OR
FOREIGN LAW WILL APPLY TO THE CLAIMS
A. DOES SECTION 44112 "RELATE TO A RATE, ROUTE,
OR SERVICE"?
Putting aside whether the liability of a commercial aircraft les-
sor might be preempted by Section 44112, could an attempt by a
state to legislate the liability of a commercial aircraft lessor in-
stead be preempted as an impermissible attempt to regulate
"rates, routes, or services" of an air carrier?
The ADA was passed by Congress as economic deregulation
under the theory that "competitive market forces," as opposed
to federal or state regulation, could best set rates, routes, and
197 See Dudley, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18426, at *17-18; Joy v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., Nos. 88-2165, 88-2351, 88-2352, 88-3012, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17185, at *11-12 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1990).
198 See Abco Metals Corp. v. J.W. Imports Co., 560 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
I- U.C.C. §§ 2A-212, -213 (2005); U.C.C. § 2A-103 cmt.g (2005); see Dudley,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18426, at *19; joy, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17185, at *11.
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services and "further 'efficiency, innovation, and low prices' as
well as 'variety [and] quality . . . of air transportation ser-
vices.' "200 Prior to the ADA, airlines were forced to operate
under a patchwork of federal and state economic regulations.0 o
Unlike the FAA Act of 1958, the ADA and the Federal Avia-
tion Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAA) contains
express preemption clauses stating that a state "may not enact or
enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force
and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier that may provide air transportation."2 0 2 The purpose of
this express preemption clause is to "ensure that the States
would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their
own,"205 resulting in a "state regulatory patchwork [that] is in-
consistent with Congress' major legislative effort to leave [price,
route, or service] decisions, where federally unregulated, to the
competitive marketplace."o In short, the ADA seeks to pre-
empt state laws that will affect the economic regulation of the
airline industry.
How and when is state law preempted as improperly regulat-
ing a price, route, or service? The answer depends on whether
the state law relates to an air carrier's price, route, or service
and, if so, whether the law has a significant impact or effect on
Congress's economic deregulatory and preemption goals.2 0 5
The challenged law need only relate indirectly to Congress's
goals, and preemption can occur even if the challenged state
law is consistent with Congress's goals.2 06 However, the impact
200 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992); see also
Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 364 (2008) (applying Morales);
Jeffrey J. Ellis, Federal Preemption, in LITIGATING THE AVIATION CASE: FROM PRE-
TIAL TO CLOSING ARGUMENTS 105, 106 (Andrew J. Harakas ed., 3d ed. 2008).
201 Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
202 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (2006); see also 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (1) (2006). Note
the original act expressly preempted rates, routes, or services. Price was substi-
tuted for rates when Congress recodified the ADA and the Federal Aviation Act
in 1994. 49 U.S.C. § 41713.
20s Morales, 504 U.S. at 378.
204 Rowe, 552 U.S. at 372-73.
205 See Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370-72; Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 383
(2004); Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 389; see also Data Mfg., Inc. v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., No. 9:07-CV-1456 (LEJ), 2008 WL 648483, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 5,
2008) (setting forth a two-part preemption test: "(1) plaintiffs claim must derive
from the enactment or enforcement of state law; and (2) plaintiffs claim must
relate to defendant's prices, routes, or services. If plaintiffs claims satisfy both of
these conditions, then they are pre-empted and must be dismissed.").
206 Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370-72; Morales, 504 U.S. at 386-87.
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of some state laws upon rates, routes, and services might be "too
tenuous, remote, or peripheral" to warrant preemption.
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Supreme Court de-
fined "relating to" as "having a connection with or reference to"
price, routes, or services.20o Applying this definition, the Court
found that state consumer protection guidelines governing the
content and format of airline advertisements had a reference to
price and rates because the guidelines required disclosure of the
purchasing requirements and whether the advertised fares were
available in quantities sufficient to meet consumer demand. 2 09
Because the guidelines related to rates, they were potentially
subject to the preemption of the ADA. 21 0
Having determined the challenged state law could be pre-
empted, the Court sought to determine if the advertising guide-
lines had a significant impact on Congress's deregulatory and
preemption objectives. 2 1 1 To do so, the Court analyzed the role
of marketing in the airline industry and the processes by which
airlines determined what price to assign to which seat.2 1 2 Find-
ing that the state-mandated guidelines severely burdened the
ability of airlines to market and price seats, the Court held that
the guidelines had a significant impact upon Congress's deregu-
latory and preemptive goals and were therefore preempted by
the ADA.2 13
Recently, the Supreme Court examined an identical express
preemption clause that appears in the FAAAA in the case of
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass'n.2 In Rowe, the
Court was presented with a challenge to a Maine law regulating
how tobacco products were to be delivered within the state. 15
Finding that the Maine law had a connection to carrier services
and would have a significant and adverse impact on Congress's
preemptive goals, the Court held that the law "produce [d] the
very effect that the federal law sought to avoid, namely, a State's
direct substitution of its own governmental commands for 'com-
207 Morales, 504 U.S. at 390; see also Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375.
208 Morales, 504 U.S. at 383.
209 Id. at 389-90.
210 Id. at 388.
211 Id. at 388-89.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 390.
214 Rowe, 552 U.S. at 367-68; see id. at 369-70 (noting that Congress copied the
express preemption language from the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 when
writing the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994).
215 Id. at 367-68.
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petitive market forces' in determining . .. the services that mo-
tor carriers will provide" and, thus, were preempted by federal
law.2 16
By looking at Rowe, it appears that a state law which has an
effect and thus forbidden under federal law is one with a "signfi-
cant impact" on rates, routes, or services." Assuming the Su-
preme Court would apply a similar analysis to the same language
appearing in the ADA, any state law having a significant impact
upon rates, routes, or services of an air carrier should be ex-
pressly preempted by the ADA.
A price or route might be easier to define under the ADA.
But neither the ADA nor the FAAA define service. The lack of a
definition has led to some disparity amongst the different cir-
cuits.2 18 The Third and Ninth Circuits have taken a narrow view
on what service means, saying that it applies to "the prices,
schedules, origins and destinations of the point-to-point trans-
portation of passengers, cargo, or mail" and does not include
"an airline's provision of in-flight beverages, personal assistance
to passengers, the handling of luggage ,and similar
amenities."2 19
In justifying this narrow definition, the Ninth Circuit in
Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. reasoned that a broader defi-
nition would result "in the preemption of virtually everything an
airline does."2 2 0 On the contrary, the court argued that the
ADA was intended to preempt just those state laws that "ad-
versely affect the economic deregulation of the airlines and the
forces of competition within the airline industry" and not tort
claims.'
216 Id. at 370-71 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 390).
217 Id. at 375 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 390) (emphasis in the original).
218 In Air Transport Ass'n ofAmerica, Inc. v. Cuomo, the Second Circuit noted that
a majority of the circuits define service broadly to include "the provision or antici-
pated provision of labor from the airline to its passengers. . . , baggage handling,
and food and drink-matters incidental to and distinct from the actual transporta-
tion of passengers." Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 223
(2d Cir. 2008).
219 Charas v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998).
See Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 1998).
What is missing from the Charas court's analysis is why it would include the price
of transportation in its definition of service when the ADA had already included
rates in its express preemption clause.
220 Charas, 160 F.3d at 1266.
221 Id. at 1261.
We conclude that when Congress enacted federal economic deregu-
lation of the airlines, it intended to insulate the industry from possi-
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However, the narrow definition of service advocated by Charas
may no longer be applicable. The Second Circuit in Air Trans-
port Ass'n v. Cuomo has read Rowe as creating a broader defini-
tion of service than Charas that includes onboard amenities.2
At issue in Cuomo was a New York state law creating a passenger
bill of rights.2 2 3 The bill of rights required airlines to provide
on-board electricity, food, water, and bathrooms to passengers
stuck on board aircraft during a lengthy ground delay.22 4 In or-
der to find that the New York law was preempted by the ADA,
the court relied on Rowe to hold that if the New York law was not
preempted it could lead to a "patchwork of state service-deter-
mining laws, rules, and regulations."2 2 1
As seen by the Supreme Court decisions in Morales and Rowe,
the ADA expressly and broadly preempts state laws that relate to
and have a significant impact on the economic goals of deregu-
lation. 6 Under Cuomo and Rowe, a state law should qualify as a
regulation of a price, route, or service and, thus, be preempted
by the ADA if the state law threatens to lead to a patchwork of
state laws, rules, and regulations that would undermine Con-
gress's intent in passing the ADA, namely, to let competitive
market services guide the airline industry.
Under Morales and Rowe, any state law that indirectly relates to
and would have a significant impact upon an air carrier's rates,
routes or services is preempted by the ADA. Could state imposi-
tion of liability upon lessors be preempted under the ADA, irre-
spective of any potential preemption under Section 44112?
Would the threat of tort liability upon a lessor potentially have a
significant impact upon the rates, routes, or services of an air
carrier? What if the potential tort liability of the lessor might
ble state economic regulation as well. It intended to encourage the
forces of competition. It did not intend to immunize the airlines
from liability for personal injuries caused by their tortious conduct.
Id. at 1266.
222 Cuomo, 520 F.3d at 223.
223 Id. at 219-20.
224 Id. at 220.
225 Id. at 223 (quoting Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 373
(2008)). Support for the worry that the New York law could lead to a patchwork
of state regulations was that nine other states had proposed similar legislation.
Id. at 224 n.1.
226 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1993). In trying to
define "relating to" from the ADA, the Court stated that "the words thus express
a broad preemptive purpose." Id.; see Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370 (referring to a House
Conference report acknowledging that the Court in Morales adopted a "broad
preemption interpretation").
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increase lease rates, thus driving up the price of passenger tick-
ets? What if the potential tort liability of the lessor causes the
lessor not to lease certain types of aircraft to certain carriers,
thus preventing the air carriers from servicing certain routes?
B. DOES SECTION 44112 RELATE TO THE SAFETY OF AIR
CARRIER OPERATIONS?
In passing the FAA Act of 1958, Congress sought to create
safety standards for domestic and international transportation
in order to "promote safety in aviation and hereby protect the
lives of persons who travel on board aircraft."227 The Act dele-
gated to the FAA the authority to regulate air safety by imple-
menting rules and regulations in order to best promote air
safety.228 These regulations cover a broad range of subjects,
from establishing pilot certification rules and in-flight proce-
dures, to how and where aircraft are to be registered.2 29
There is no express preemption provision in the FAA Act of
1958. To the contrary, the Act contains a savings clause, which
reserves to the states the right to create remedies for those in-
jured or killed in aviation accidents. 23 0 The FAA Act of 1958
states: "Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or
alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but
the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies.""2 1
States are still actively trying to promote safety and the needs
of their citizens in commercial aviation through legislation.
Because both Congress and the states are active in aviation legis-
lation, litigation involving commercial air carriers frequently re-
quires a discussion of how and to what extent the FAA Act of
1958 might preempt state law.
For many years it appeared there was confusion, if not disa-
greement, over whether the FAA Act of 1958 and the regula-
tions created under it impliedly preempted state or territorial
laws regarding the standard of care for aviation safety.2" Al-
227 Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 364, 368 (3d Cir. 1999) (quot-
ing In re Mex. City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1983)).
228 Id. at 369.
229 Id.
230 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006).
231 Id.
232 See Air Transp. Ass'n v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 220, 224 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008).
233 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 625-26
(1973); Witty v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 381, 384-85 (5th Cir. 2004);
Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 363-64; French v. Pan Am Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 1 (1st
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though there still is not unanimity, the trend now appears to be
that federal law occupies the entire field of commercial aviation
safety, and there is no room for the states to establish standards
of care. But state law provides the remedy for harm resulting
from a violation of the federally imposed standard of care."3
1. Does Field Preemption Preclude the States from Imposing Tort
Liability Upon Aircraft Lessors?
Implied federal preemption of state law relies on congres-
sional intent and can take two forms: field preemption and con-
flict preemption.23 5 Field preemption of state law is found when
the "Congressional intent to preempt is inferred from the exis-
tence of a pervasive regulatory scheme" or a "comprehensive
scheme of federal regulation.""2 3  Basically, field preemption of
state law occurs "if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legisla-
tive field" in question.
The Third Circuit in Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc. laid out
a compelling argument that the FAA Act of 1958 and the FARs
promulgated under it constituted implied field preemption of
state law air safety regulations." By looking at the legislative
history and how courts have interpreted it, the Abdullah court
found that the Act and "relevant federal regulations establish
complete and thorough safety standards . . . that are not subject
to supplementation by, or variation among, jurisdictions."3
This finding was supported because the congressional pur-
pose behind the act was "to promote safety in aviation and
thereby protect the lives of persons who travel on board aircraft"
by creating a uniform system of air safety regulation under fed-
eral control.24 0 The court reasoned that it was "the evident in-
Cir. 1989); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1974);
Miezin v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 2005 WI App 120, 701 N.W. 2d 626 l
1-2; see also Ellis, supra note 200, at 108, 111. But see Cleveland ex rel. Cleveland v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Air Crash
Disaster atJohn F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1980).
234 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 375-76.
235 Id. at 367; see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992);
Witty, 366 F.3d at 384.
256 Witty, 366 F.3d at 384 (quoting Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334,
335 (5th Cir. 1995)).
23 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367; see also Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485
U.S. 293, 300 (1988).
238 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 368 (quoting In re Mex. City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400,
406 (9th Cir. 1983)); see id. at 369-70.
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tent of Congress that there be federal supervision of air safety"
and "that federal law preempts the general field of aviation
safety." 2 4 1
Having determined that the FAA Act of 1958 can preempt
state air safety regulations, the Abdullah court held that when
faced with an aviation tort case, a court should look at the appli-
cable FARs and, if no regulation speaks to the situation, to con-
sider "whether the overall operation or conduct in question was
careless or reckless" as set forth in the general standard of care
described in FAR 91.13.242
While federal law sets the standard of care for aviation opera-
tions, "traditional state and territorial law remedies continue to
exist for violation of those standards."2 4 3 The extent of this im-
plied preemption of state law is quite broad, with federal law
preempting "any state or territorial standards of care relating to
aviation safety."244
Abdullah's finding of broad implied preemption has found
support beyond the Third Circuit.245 In Witty v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., the Fifth Circuit determined that by passing the FAA Act of
1958, "Congress enacted a pervasive regulatory scheme covering
air safety concerns," thus preempting an airline passenger's fail-
ure to warn claim against an airline.246 Because of the implied
preemptive effect of the Act, and since there was no federal reg-
ulation requiring such a warning, the plaintiffs claim failed.2 4 7
The Fifth Circuit noted that because of the comprehensive
scheme of federal aviation regulations, there was both field and
conflict preemption of state laws and standards that conflicted
and interfered with federal law and objectives. 4 In finding
field preemption, the court stated that "federal regulatory re-
quirements for passenger safety warnings and instructions are
241 Id. at 371.
242 Id. "Thus, in determining the standards of care in an aviation negligence
action, a court must refer not only to specific regulations but also to the overall
concept that aircraft may not be operated in a careless or reckless manner." Id.;
see 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2009).
243 Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 375.
244 Id.
245 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007) (adopting
"the Third Circuit's broad, historical approach to hold that federal law generally
establishes the applicable standards of care in the field of aviation safety"); Witty
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2009).
246 Witty, 366 F.3d at 385.
247 Id.
24 Id. at 384.
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exclusive and preempt all state standards and requirements."2 4 9
To support conflict preemption of state law, the court reasoned
that "[a]llowing courts and juries to decide under state law that
warnings should be given in addition to those required by the
Federal Aviation Administration would necessarily conflict with
the federal regulations." 2 5 0 Having preempted the state law fail-
ure to warn claim, the court noted "at a minimum, any such
claim must be based on a violation of federally mandated
warnings."125
The Ninth Circuit in Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, relying on
Abdullah and Witty, affirmed a district court determination that
the FAA Act of 1958 and relevant federal regulations preempted
a failure to warn claim because the FAA Act of 1958 and the
regulations constituted field preemption of the entire field of
aviation safety.25 2 In support of this decision, the court relied on
the purpose and legislative history of the Act as well as the dele-
gation of regulatory authority to the FAA and its subsequent reg-
ulations to find that Congress intended for the Act to impliedly
preempt state law.25 ' Additional support was found by reason-
ing that if there was no preemption, individual state legislation
could lead to confusion and would be contrary to the unique
relationship that exists between the federal government and air
transportation.254
Although the court found that Congress intended for federal
law to be the "sole regulator of aviation safety," the court indi-
cated that "Congress may not have acted to occupy exclusively
all of air commerce."2 " The effect of this sentence is difficult to
determine, but it could be used to limit the broad preemptive
effect of the FAA Act of 1958 by allowing state regulation of air
commerce but not air safety.
The Sixth Circuit concurred with Abdullah, holding in Greene
v. B.F Good-rich Avionics Systems, Inc. that "federal law establishes
the standards of care in the field of aviation safety and thus
preempts the field from state regulation."5 6 The Greene holding
is interesting because the Sixth Circuit found that implied pre-
249 Id. at 385.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007).
253 Id. at 470-74.
254 Id. at 473.
255 Id. at 474.
256 409 F.3d 784, 795 (6th Cir. 2005).
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emption under the FAA Act of 1958 was broad enough to pre-
empt the plaintiffs strict products liability claim against a
manufacturer for failing to warn about a defective product.257
Although it declined to make a formal determination, the
Second Circuit in Air Transport Ass'n v. Cuomo noted that a New
York Passenger Bill of Rights law might be impliedly preempted
since it could open the door to other states enacting laws speci-
fying what food an airline must serve on an outbound flight. 2 58
Allowing states to enact such laws would lead to the "unraveling
[of] the centralized federal framework for air travel."25 9 This
commentary by the Second Circuit is especially interesting since
the Second Circuit does not agree with Abdullah that the FAA
Act of 1958 preempts all state law tort actions.26 o While it did
not alter course, the Second Circuit's dicta in Cuomo suggests a
broader acceptance of the premise that the FAA Act of 1958
impliedly preempts state law when such laws will affect the fed-
eral regulatory scheme and framework of air travel.2 6 1
The effect of Abdullah and its brethren is relatively simple: fed-
eral aviation law sets the standard of care for aviation safety and
preempts state law that attempts to regulate aviation safety or to
establish a different standard of care. 62 Yet, the states retain the
right to specify what remedies apply.263
Should states have a right to provide a cause of action against
a commercial aircraft lessor if no federal law provides a cause of
action? Is a cause of action against an aircraft lessor in reality
only a remedy which is expressly reserved to the states under the
FAA Act of 1958?264
257 See id. at 794-95.
258 Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 224-25 (2d Cir.
2008).
259 Id. at 225.
260 Id.
261 Id. (stating that "[iinsofar as the [Passenger Bill of Rights] is intended to
prescribe standards of airline safety, we note, finally, that it may also be impliedly
preempted by the FAA and regulations promulgated thereunder").
262 See Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating
that state law may be "preempted to the extent that a federal standard must be
used but that state remedies are available") (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
181 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 1999).
263 Id.
264 These comments are based in part on how broadly the Abdullah implied
preemption has been read. As was seen in Greene v. B.F Goodrich Avionics Systems,
Inc., the plaintiffs failure to warn claim failed because there was no requirement
in the federal regulations to warn about the manufacturing defect. 409 F.3d 784,
794-95 (6th Cir. 2005). Considering the broad nature of Abdullah and how the
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2. Does Section 44112 Preempt State Laws Under A Conflict
Analysis?
Conflict preemption exists when state law conflicts with fed-
eral law.2 65 In other words, conflict preemption exists "when it
is impossible to comply with both state and federal law."2 6 6 As
seen in Witty, there is implied conflict preemption where "the
imposition of state standards would conflict with federal law and
interfere with federal objectives." 6 7
Should Section 44112 preempt state laws holding aircraft les-
sors liable for injury, death, or property damage under implied
conflict preemption theory under the FAA Act of 1958? The
federal objective behind Section 44112 is to encourage aircraft
financing by eliminating the risk of civil liability for those en-
gaged in aircraft financing. 26 8 Any state law that would increase
the risk of civil liability beyond Section 44112 arguably conflicts
with Section 44112 and would be preempted.
There may be confusion over the scope of Section 44112, but
no court can ignore that the statute is on the books. Any state
court opinion that performs a thorough preemption analysis
and fails to acknowledge at least a potential conflict between
Section 44112 and state law imposing liability upon an aircraft
lessor should be analytically suspect. Logic dictates that once
the true scope of Section 44112 has been ascertained there
should be conflict preemption of contradictory state laws within
the scope of the statute.
Greene court applied Abdullah to a products liability claim, the conclusion that if
the Act and the FARs do not provide the cause of action then state law being
preempted from providing a cause of action falls in line with the Abdullah
court's determination that Congress intended the Act to occupy the field of air
safety regulation. Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 371. This is supported by the Seventh
Circuit decision in Bieneman v. City of Chicago, where the court held that "the state
may employ damages remedies only to enforce federal requirements" and "may
not use common law procedures to question federal decisions," referring to the
FARs. 864 F.2d 463, 473 (7th Cir. 1988).
265 Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
266 Id.; see Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 367; see also Witty, 366 F.3d at 384 (finding
conflict preemption when "state law conflicts with federal law or interferes with
the achievement of federal objectives").
267 Witty, 366 F.3d at 384; see Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
268 H.R. REP. No. 80-2091 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836.
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C. CASES HOLDING THAT SECTION 44112 PREEMPTS STATE LAw
One of the earlier cases addressing the preemptive effect of
Section 1404 was Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc.211 In that case,
a Colorado federal district court interpreted Section 1404 to
read "in essence that no persons who merely have a security in-
terest in aircraft or who are lessors of thirty days or more shall
be liable for property or personal damages caused by an aircraft
unless those persons be in actual possession or control at the
time of such injury."w2 o At issue in Rosdail was the liability of a
plane owner who leased his plane to a corporation.271 The cor-
poration then leased the plane to a pilot who in turn crashed
it.272
Rosdail's reading of Section 1404 found support in the Fifth
Circuit when it was relied on in Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Ser-
vice, Inc. to support a holding that Section 1404 "appears clearly
and forthrightly to preempt any contrary state law which might
subject holders of security interests to liability for injuries."273
Rogers was also a fixed-base operator case.274 The owner of a pri-
vate airplane leased the plane to a fixed-based operator that in
turn rented the plane to the pilot that crashed it.2 75 Rogers lends
support to the argument that Section 1404 and Section 44112
would preempt commercial aircraft lessor liability, at least in
part, because the court determined that the purpose of Section
1404 was to "facilitate financing of the purchase of aircraft by
providing that those holding security interests would not be lia-
ble for injuries caused by falling planes or the parts thereof."276
A year after Rogers, the Tenth Circuit had an opportunity to
interpret Section 1404 in McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp." Here,
26 297 F. Supp. 681, 684-85 (D. Colo. 1969). We will discuss §§ 1404 and
44112 interchangeably except where noted. There were some earlier cases that
looked at § 1404 shortly after it had passed and found no preemptive effect for
vicarious liability for an aircraft owner or lessor. See Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d
481, 482 (5th Cir. 1955); Hoebee v. Howe, 97 A.2d 223, 226 (N.H. 1953). These
cases later received negative treatment or were overturned. See McCord v. Dixie
Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 1971) (stating "[w]e reject the
Hoebee rationale"); Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389,
1392-94 (5th Cir. 1970).
270 Rosdail, 297 F. Supp. at 685.
271 Id. at 682.
272 Id.
273 Rogers, 435 F.2d at 1394.
274 Id. at 1391.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 1394.
277 450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
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the Tenth Circuit explicitly agreed with the Fifth Circuit's inter-
pretation from Rogers.278 Having quoted Rogers, the court stated
that "[w]e agree with this interpretation. The specific purpose
having been determined, we find no merit in appellants' argu-
ment that Congress, failing to specifically exempt owners and
lessors, intended that they be absolutely liable for injuries sus-
tained by passengers of leased aircraft."279
The Seventh Circuit briefly addressed the issue of preemption
in Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co.280 Here, the court affirmed the
district court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant
aircraft owner, Robert Hansel, because he had leased the air-
craft to a corporation, thus not having possession or control of
the aircraft when it crashed.28 ' The district court held that the
defendant was not liable under Section 1404 or Illinois's com-
mon law of bailment.282
On appeal, the court briefly acknowledged that Section 1404
can preempt state law by explaining when a lessor or owner can
and cannot be liable under Section 1404. Having discussed
Section 1404, the court then went on to explain what the plain-
tiff would need to show to make the defendant liable under the
Illinois common law of bailment, concluding that the plaintiffs
claim would not succeed under that theory either.28 4 Because
the court discussed the plaintiffs common law bailment claim
in addition to affirming that Section 1404 would preempt, the
Illinois appellate court in Retzler reasoned that Matei determined
that Section 1404 actually does not preempt state law.285
A more recent interpretation of Section 44112 that arguably
supports the preemption of a state law claim against a commer-
cial aircraft lessor is found in Coleman v. Windham Aviation,
Inc.2"1 While the court read Section 44112 to not preempt the
278 Id. at 1130-31.
279 Id. at 1130. The specific purpose referred to in the quote is that § 1404 was
passed to facilitate aircraft financing. Id. (citing Rogers, 435 F.2d at 1389).
280 Matei v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 35 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1994).
281 Id. at 1146, 1148.
282 Id. at 1144.
283 Id. at 1145. This determination is subject to some dispute because Retzler v.
Pratt 6f Whitney Co. read Matei as not preempting state law. Retzler, 723 N.E.2d
345, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). The Retzler case and cases rebuffing it will be dis-
cussed later.
284 Matei, 35 F.3d at 1144-45.
285 See Retzler, 723 N.E.2d at 352.
286 No. Civ. A. K.C.2004-0985, 2005 WL 1793907, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 18,
2005).
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liability of the aircraft owner, the court indicated that it would
support preemption for a commercial aircraft lessor.2 8 7 The un-
derlying issue in Coleman was whether the owner/lessor of an
aircraft could be vicariously liable under Rhode Island or Con-
necticut law for the negligence of the pilot to whom it leased the
aircraft.288
The defendant, Windham Aviation, argued that Section
44112 would preempt "any provision of state law which purports
to impose vicarious liability on the basis of aircraft owner-
ship."2 8 In trying to determine whether or not Section 44112
preempted state law, the court conducted a thorough analysis of
Section 44112 and its history, including the history behind Sec-
tion 1404.290 Having looked at Section 44112, Section 1404, and
the House Report, the court found that it had
no difficulty concluding that Congress passed Section 1404 to fa-
cilitate the financing of private airplanes by exempting owners or
lessors holding only a security interest in an aircraft from liability
for negligent operation of that aircraft. In addition, the [House
Report] also explicitly states the intent of Congress to hold own-
ers in possession of an aircraft, either personally or through an
agent, liable for damages caused by negligent operation.29'
While the court then went on to hold the defendant aircraft
owner liable, the court did so because it determined that Sec-
tion 1404 and Section 44112 do "not provide an exemption for
[the defendant] as [the defendant] outright owned the Piper
involved in the fatal collision."2 9 2 Based on this reasoning and
how the court interpreted Section 1404 and Section 44112,
under Coleman there is arguably support for the premise that
Section 44112 would preempt the imposition of liability upon a
commercial aircraft lessor who was not in possession of the air-
craft at the time of the accident.
287 Id. at *5-6.
288 Id. at *1. It cannot go without mentioning that there is a surprising lack of
reference by the Coleman court to any decisions that interpret § 1404 and
§ 44112. The court cites to case law that discusses statutory construction, id. at
*4, yet there is no mention of any decision that discusses the actual interpretation
of § 1404 or § 44112. This case was decided in 2005, so there was plenty of refer-
ence material available on the subject, including cases like Retzler that argue for
no preemptive effect by § 44112. See Retzler, 723 N.E.2d at 352.
289 Coleman, 2005 WL 1793907, at *2.
290 Id. at *2-6.




The determination of whether Section 44112 preempts is
driven by the status and relationship between the lessor/owner
and the aircraft itself. Under Coleman, if the commercial aircraft
lessor is not in actual possession of the aircraft, then Section
44112 preemption should exempt the commercial aircraft lessor
from liability. 29 3
Coleman is not without its detractors, as was seen in a Connect-
icut case, Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., decided several months
after Coleman. 9 4 In Mangini, that court found Coleman's analysis
of Section 1404 and Section 44112 was unpersuasive.2 9 5
Mangini's core dispute with Coleman is its disagreement that Cole-
man ignored the addition of a definition of owner when Section
1404 was recodified into Section 44112.6
While Mangini disputes the owner aspect of Coleman, the cen-
tral holding in Mangini is that "Congress announced that it in-
tended 49 U.S.C. Section 1404 and its present version, 49 U.S.C.
Section 44112, to preempt state law and to exempt from liability
those persons who met the other criteria of those statutes. "297
What does the Mangini court likely mean by "other criteria?" 298
Is the court referring to actual possession or control under Sec-
tion 44112? Is it referring to the requirement that an applicable
lease be for a period greater than thirty days? Is the court refer-
ring to a requirement that the injury, death, or loss be "on land
or water?"29 9  In reaching its conclusion that Section 44112
preempts state law, the court in Mangini cited several federal
court decisions previously discussed in this article.oo
Last year, there were two additional examples of courts' find-
ing that Section 44112 preempts state law, at least under some
293 Id.; cf Stephen P. Sheehan, No Federal Bar to Vicarious Liability of Aircraft
Owners, 55-Jun R.I. B.J. 19, 19-23 (2007) (discussing the holding of Coleman).
294 Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos. X07CV044001467S, X07CV0440034
18S, 2005 WL 3624483, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005).
2 Id.
6 Id.
- Id. at *6.
298 Id.
9 See id. at *1.
300 See id. at *6. Specifically, the court relied on the following cases: In re Inlow
Accident Litig., 2001 WL 3316251, at *15 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001); Matei v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 35 F.3d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1994); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999); Rogers v Ray Gardiner Flying Serv., Inc., 435
F.2d 1389, 1394 (5th Cir. 1970); and Rosdail v. W. Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp.
681, 685 (D.C. Colo. 1969).
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circumstances.s' In Esheva v. Siberia Airlines, the Southern Dis-
trict of New York addressed in a footnote the liability of a com-
mercial aircraft lessor, Airbus Leasing II, while deciding to
conditionally grant a forum non conveniens motion:
There is a compelling argument that Airbus was added to this
litigation solely to provide some American nexus to the litigation,
albeit not a New York nexus. To the extent that it is facing a
claim of derivative liability, Airbus is absolutely immune for such lia-
bility in the United States. American law provides that a "lessor
. . . is liable for personal injury, death or property loss or damage
... only when a civil aircraft . .. is in the actual possession or
control of the lessor. . . ." 49 U.S.C. Section 44112(b).3 0 2
Although this comment is hidden in a footnote, this case is
helpful in crafting an argument that Section 44112 preempts
commercial aircraft liability since the facts are analogous to the
Air Philippines case.s03 In Esheva, the defendant, Airbus Leasing
II, was a commercial aircraft lessor and the aircraft involved was
being operated by a foreign airline on a domestic route in
Russia.304
In the Air Philippines case, we saw a similar situation, the only
difference being that the aircraft had been manufactured in the
United States. 0 Because of the similarity between Esheva and
Air Philippines, the Southern District of New York looks to be an
attractive forum for the defendant aircraft lessor. However, as
was discussed earlier in the implied preemption section, the Sec-
ond Circuit has not yet determined if the FAA Act of 1958 im-
pliedly preempts state law. 06 Yet, in Cuomo, we saw that the
Second Circuit might be leaning towards a finding of implied
preemption.0
301 Esheva v. Siberia Airlines, 499 F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
Vreeland v. Ferrer, No. 2005-CA-003534, 2007 WL 5552091 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sept. 26,
2007). Besides the two cases to be discussed below, there is a third case which
discusses preemption as well. This third case, Ellis v. Flying Boat Inc., was a federal
district court case in Florida. It will not be discussed because the author was
unable to locate a copy of the opinion. The only citation we have uncovered is:
Ellis v. Flying Boat, Inc., Case No. 06-20066-CIV-Seitz.Mcaliley (S.D. Fla. 2006).
302 Esheva, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 499 n.4 (emphasis added).
303 Id. at 496-97; see Ellis v. AAR Parts Trading Inc., 828 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005).
304 Esheva, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
305 Ellis, 828 N.E.2d at 730.
306 In re Air Crash Disaster atJohn F. Kennedy Int'l Airport, 635 F.2d 67, 74 (2d
Cir. 1980).




The other recent instance where a court found Section 44112
to preempt state law was the Florida state case, Vreeland v. Fer-
rer.30o There, the defendant aircraft lessor, Aerolease, sought
summary judgment on the lessee plaintiffs negligence claim by
arguing that Section 44112 preempts Florida's Dangerous In-
strumentality Doctrine.3 0 9 In a short, two-page opinion, the
court agreed with the lessor, stating that "under a plain reading
of 49 U.S.C.A. Section 44112, AEROLEASE, described as the les-
sor and owner of the aircraft in the AIRCRAFT LEASE, was a
lessor/owner who was not in the actual possession or control of the
airplane. Therefore, 49 U.S.C.A. [sic] 44112 is applicable, pre-
empting Florida law as to AEROLEASE only.""'o
As can be seen from the above cases, a range of courts from
state trial courts to federal circuit courts have read Section
44112 and its predecessor Section 1404 to preempt state law for
commercial lessors."'1 But is the scope of preemption absolute?
Does it extend to wrongful death and personal injury claims of
passengers? Or is it limited to death, injury, and loss that occurs
"on land or water?" Does preemption extend to the indepen-
dent acts of alleged negligence by the lessor, acts that might be
characterized as negligent entrustment or negligent supervi-
sion? Or is preemption limited to the vicarious liability of the
lessor?
D. CASES HOLDING THAT SECTION 44112 DOES NOT PREEMPT
STATE LAW
There are several cases that stand for the proposition that Sec-
tion 44112 does not preempt state law. 3 12 Both cases were at the




31 See McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (10th Cir.
1971); Mangini v. Cessna Aircraft Co., Nos. X07CV044001467S,
X07CV044003418S, 2005 WL 3624483, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2005).
312 See Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co., 723 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999);
Storie v. Southfield Leasing, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
There is a third decision that finds § 44112 does not preempt state law. In Layug
v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc., the appellate court relied solely on the Retzler and Matei
decisions to find that § 44112 did not preempt the state-law claim against the
defendant lessors. See Layug v. AAR Parts Trading, Inc., 2003 WL 25744436 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. May 16, 2003). Because this section of the article discusses how Retzler is a
poorly decided decision and how Matei has been misread by Retzler to support a
lack of preemption, lengthy analysis on why the Layug court holding is poorly
reasoned is not warranted.
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state level and have received some negative treatment by cases
that support the argument that Section 44112 preempts state
law. 13 Both cases will be discussed along with those presenting
a counterargument.
In Stone v. Southfield Leasing, the Michigan Court of Appeals
addressed the appeal of a representative of a deceased passen-
ger who died when a small plane, owned and leased by the de-
fendant to the passengers' employer, crashed.1 The appellate
court dismissed the claim on a summary judgment motion, find-
ing that Section 1404 preempted a Michigan aircraft ownership
liability statute. 1 In reviewing the appeal, the appellate court
held that Section 1404 does not expressly or impliedly preempt
a Michigan law unless the injury occurred "on the surface of the
earth.""' The reasoning behind this holding comes from the
following language in Section 1404: "No person . . . shall be lia-
ble . . . for any injury to or death of persons, or damage to or
loss of property, on the surface of the earth (whether on land or
water) caused by such aircraft."" The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs injury did not occur on the surface of the earth.s~s
This is a questionable conclusion based upon the strict lan-
guage of the statute because the court quoted Section 1404 in
full, but chose to apply the surface of the earth element as being
the only aspect that could lead to preemption.3 1' A reasonable
person looking at this reasoning may disagree, especially when
reading the rest of the sentence from which the court took sur-
face of the earth, which states "on the surface of the earth
(whether on land or water) caused by such aircraft, aircraft en-
gine, or propeller, or by the ascent, descent, or flight of such
aircraft." 3 20
Why did the court choose to rely on the first half of the quota-
tion and not acknowledge that an injury could be caused by "the
flight of such aircraft?" Is this a flaw in the court's analysis or is
the conclusion the result of a well-reasoned consideration of the
313 In re Inlow Accident Litig., No. IP 99-0830-C H//G, 2001 WL 331625 (S.D.
Ind. Feb. 7, 2001).
314 Stofie, 282 N.W.2d at 418.
315 Id. at 420-21.
316 Id. at 422.
317 Id. at 420.
318 Id. at 422. This logic is potentially confounding because no matter where
in flight or at what altitude the accident occurs, the accident is not concluded
until the aircraft returns to earth.
319 Id. at 420-21.
320 Id. at 420 (emphasis added).
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legislative history which notes that Section 1404 was intended to
protect the security tide holder from becoming liable for "exten-
sive damages on the surface caused by the operation of the
aircraft?"S2 1
We should recall that "ascent, descent . ." was omitted from
Section 44112.322 The House Report accompanying Section
44112 indicated that such language was omitted as surplus.3 23
"[O]n the surface of the earth" was stricken and replaced with
"on land or water" so as to eliminate unnecessary words. 2 4
Stone was subsequently affirmed by the Michigan Supreme
Court, 25 but as the court in In re Inlow argues, it is difficult to
determine if the Michigan Supreme Court was affirming that
Section 1404 can preempt in certain instances or whether it
does not preempt at all.3 2 6
The second case holding that Section 44112 does not pre-
empt state law is the Illinois Appellate Court decision, Retzler v.
Pratt & Whitney Co.3 2 1 Here, the court relied on Matei to find
that Section 44112 did not preempt a flight attendant's com-
mon law bailment claim against the aircraft owner/lessor. 2
The factual background of Retzler is helpful for our analysis as it
deals with a commercial airline and a leased aircraft.2
321 H.R. REP. No. 103-2091, at 1837 (1948).
322 H.R. REP. No. 103-180 (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 See Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843, 847 n.2 (Mich.
1982).
326 In re Inlow Accident Litig., No. IP 99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL 331625, at *16
(S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001). Besides Inlow, additional support for an argument
against Storie could be made by relying on Montalvo and Abdullah. From the
Abdullah line of cases, we have seen that federal law sets the standard of care and
preempts any different state law standard. Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d
464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d
Cir. 1999). In Stofie, the court based part of its reasoning on a Michigan law for
aircraft operator negligence intended to increase the safety of aircraft flown
within the state by imposing liability upon the aircraft owner. Storie v. Southfield
Leasing, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). It was thought that the
imposition of such liability upon the owner would "encourage increased supervi-
sion over the maintenance of aircraft." Id. Should the Michigan law be creating
a stricter standard than federal law, such law would be impliedly preempted
under Abdullah. If so, Abdullah should preempt the law that the Storie plaintiff
claim was based upon, and the Stoie court may have come to a different
conclusion.
327 723 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
328 Id.
329 Id. at 349.
2010] 119
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The aircraft involved, an ATR 42-300, had been purchased by
AMR Leasing Corporation (AMR) and then sold to a French
company, Mathilde Bail G.I.E.3 s Mathilde Bail then leased the
aircraft back to AMR, who in turn leased the aircraft under an
oral agreement to Simmons Airlines, Inc."3 Simmons Airlines
owned American Eagle, the plaintiffs employer.13 2 So, Mathilde
Bail was the owner and lessor of the aircraft, AMR was the
lessee/sublessor, and Simmons Airlines was the sublessee. 3
Less than a month after these transactions occurred, the ATR
experienced an engine failure shortly after takeoff.3 34 In re-
sponse to the emergency, the pilot began an emergency descent
to land, resulting in the plaintiff being injured in the plane's
galley.3 3' The plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the plane's en-
gine and alleged that AMR was the owner of the aircraft and
that AMR had been negligent in the maintaining, testing, and
inspection of the plane.3 The plaintiff claimed that the defect
in the engine and AMR's negligence resulted in the engine fail-
ure and emergency descent that caused her injury. 3
AMR filed a motion for summary judgment, one of the
grounds being that the plaintiffs claims were impliedly pre-
empted by Section 44112.33' The appellate court found that
Section 44112 preempted the plaintiffs claims and dismissed
the matter.33 9 The plaintiffs appeal led to the appellate court
analysis discussed below.
The court held that "section 44112 does not preempt a per-
sonal injury action under state law against AMR, the aircraft les-
sors in the instant case."3 4 0 Looking at Matei, the court
determined that Matei found:
[NJot that the state law claim was preempted by section 1404, but
that the plaintiff simply had not established a case under Illinois
common law. If the federal statute preempted state law claims,









3 Id. at 350. The other ground was that the plaintiff failed to establish that
AMR Leasing owed her a duty to support her negligence claim. Id.
33 Id. at 352, 354.
3 Id. at 353.
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at all on the state law claims. Thus, Matei implicitly rejected the
idea that state claims against lessors were preempted by section
1404.se
Moving on from Matei, the court attempted to bolster its no-
preemption argument by relying on Abdullah." By arguing that
common law bailment is a state law remedy, the court reasoned
that under Abdullah a state remedy would not be impliedly pre-
empted by the FAA Act of 1958 since the Act only preempts state
standards of care. 43 This reasoning earned a lengthy rebuttal
by a federal district court in In re Inlow, which will be discussed
later. 14
Continuing to rely on Abdullah, the court noted that federal
aviation law preempts state remedies "where there is an irrecon-
cilable conflict between the federal and state standards or where
the imposition of a state standard in a damages action would
frustrate the objectives of the federal law."3 4 5 Having just dis-
cussed how federal law preempts state law when there is a con-
flict, one would expect the court to have analyzed whether or
not there was an irreconcilable conflict between Section 44112
and Illinois law, or if imposing liability would frustrate the objec-
tives behind Section 44112. But the court did not take this ap-
proach. Instead, the court seemed to ignore what it had just
written and moved on to discuss the savings clause and insur-
ance provisions of the FAA Act of 1958.346
Once it was through discussing Abdullah, the court made its
last argument by stating that "[o]ther states have also rejected
the idea that state personal injury claims are preempted by sec-
tion 1404 (now 49 U.S.C. Section 44112 (1994))."sol Of the
"other states," the only state the court mentioned was Michigan,
and the court claimed that Michigan in the Sexton decision "out-
right" rejected Section 1404 preempting state law.3 48 Having de-
termined that Section 44112 did not preempt the personal
341 Id. at 352 (citations omitted).
342 Id. at 352-53.
34 Id.
34 See In re Inlow Accident Litig., No. IP 99-0830-C H/G, 2001 WL 331625, at
*16 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2001).
34 Retzler, 723 N.E.2d at 352 (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d
363, 375 (3d Cir. 1999).
346 Id.
347 Id. at 353.
348 Id. (citing Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Mich.
1982) in which the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the Storie v. Southfield Leas-
ing, Inc. finding that § 1404 does not preempt state law); see In re Inlow, 2001 WL
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injury action against the aircraft lessor, the court went on to de-
termine that the lessor could be liable under a state-law bail-
ment theory.349
The Southern District of Indiana, in In re Inlow, addressed and
provided an interesting explanation and rebuttal of the argu-
ments made by the Storie and Retzler courts and concluded that
Section 44112 does preempt state law."'o The plaintiff in In re
Inlow died after being hit in the head by a helicopter rotor blade
after disembarking from a helicopter."5 ' The helicopter was
made by Eurocopter and purchased by CIHC, Inc.3 52 The
purchase was financed by GE Capital, which leased the helicop-
ter to CIHC."5 CIHC in turn subleased the helicopter to its cor-
porate parent and the plaintiffs employer, Conseco, Inc. 5 4 The
helicopter was then operated by Conseco Flight Operations. 5
The plaintiffs survivors sued CIHC and Conseco for negligent
operation and failure to warn of defective product. 56 CIHC
moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs
claims were preempted by Section 44112 because CIHC was the
lessor of the aircraft. 5  The court agreed, stating "[t]he plain
language of Section 44112 establishes that it preempts state
common law claims against covered lessors."635
The court drew support for its holding by looking at the legis-
lative history, in particular House Report 2091, noting that Sec-
tion 1404 was passed in response to the Uniform Aeronautics
Act that was in force in ten states.3 59 The Uniform Aeronautics
Act "declared the 'owner' of every aircraft 'absolutely liable' for
injuries caused by the flight of the aircraft, regardless of the
owner's degree of control over a lessee."36 0 From House Report
2091, the court concluded that "[Section 1404] was plainly in-
331625, at *16 (rebutting the Retzler conclusion that Sexton "outright" rejected
§ 1404).
349 Retzler, 723 N.E.2d at 353.
350 See generally In re Inlow, 2001 WL 331625.
s51 Id. at *1.
352 Id. at *8.
353 Id. From the description of the litigation provided by the court, it does not
seem that GE Capital was named as a defendant in this litigation.
354 Id.
355 Id. at *7.
356 Id. at *1.






tended, and plainly written, to preempt such state statutes and
parallel common law claims." 6 1
Having analyzed the history behind Section 44112, the court
held that "CIHC falls squarely within the purview of Section
44112."362 However, the court did not end its analysis there. In-
stead, the court set forth a test for when Section 44112 should
apply and discussed the Matei, Retzler and Stone decisions. 63
According to the In re Inlow court, the test is as follows: Sec-
tion 44112 does not require "any inquiry into whether the les-
sor's role in financing was necessary, convenient, or anything
else."3" There is only a need to answer two questions: (1) was
there a lease for more than thirty days? and (2) did the lessor
have actual possession or control of the aircraft?365 If the answer
is yes to the former and no to the latter, then Section 44112
applies. 3 66
Looking at the facts of the case, the court sought to deter-
mine whether or not there was control of the aircraft.' The
plaintiffs pointed towards the lease between GE Capital and
CIHC as evidence of control. 68 The court responded that the
lease imposed legal obligations but did not "prove that CIHC
had actual possession or control of the helicopter" to warrant
liability because the helicopter was subleased to Conseco Inc.
and operated by Conseco Flight Operations.6 9
In discussing Matei, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit
did not address whether or not Section 1404 preempted a state-
361 Id. (citations omitted).
362 Id.
363 Id. at *14-16.
36 Id. at *14.
365 Id.
366 See id. at *18 (stating "[t]hrough its requirement that a lessor must be in
,actual possession or control' of the aircraft at the time of accident, § 44112 pre-
vents the imposition of liability on lessors that are not engaged in some concrete
fashion in the operation of the aircraft").
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Id. From a commercial aircraft lessor perspective, this determination on
possession and control is very helpful for structuring leases. The court seems to
find that one corporate entity leasing to another is enough to warrant a finding
that the lessor did not have possession or control of the aircraft sufficient for
Section 44112 liability protection. A flaw in this reasoning is that the court seems
to neglect that CIHC and Conseco Flight Operations were both subsidiaries of
Conseco, Inc. Under this reasoning, if one corporate sub purchases and then
leases an aircraft to another corporate sub, that leasing relationship would war-
rant liability protection under Section 44112.
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law claim.17 0 Instead, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a district court opinion that found Section 1404 pre-
empted state law, and noted that the district court's decision was
persuasive.3 7 ' Addressing Retzler, the court held that Retzler's re-
liance on Abdullah was misplaced because Abdullah did not dis-
cuss Section 44112.372
The court continued its rebuttal of Retzler by noting that the
Retzler court's argument that the FAA Act of 1958 savings and
insurance clauses support the use of state law remedies to over-
come Section 44112, and Retzler's interpretation of the clauses
"ultimately gives Section 44112 no effect. . . . If Section 44112
did not apply to limit liability arising under state law for per-
sonal injuries, Section 44112 would have no apparent effect." 7 3
Lastly, the court rebutted Michigan's finding of no preemp-
tion in Stofie, as affirmed by the Michigan Supreme Court.3 7 4
Calling for a closer examination of the Michigan Supreme
Court's analysis, the court noted that "it is unclear whether the
Michigan Supreme Court in Sexton meant to adopt Storie's deter-
mination that there was no preemption because of the facts of
the case or whether it meant to reject the Court of Appeals' le-
gal conclusion that there would be preemption if Section 1404
applied." 75 Havingjust questioned the Sexton and Stoie conclu-
sions, the court noted that under the Stoyie reasoning, Section
1404 should preempt since the plaintiffs injury occurred on the
surface of the earth.376
The In re Inlow decision presents an interesting dilemma for
Section 44112 cases in the Seventh Circuit. As noted in the dis-
cussion of Storie, Congress elected to remove "on the surface of
the earth" as unnecessary when it recodified Section 1404 into
Section 44112. There is little authority besides Stoie that ad-
dresses the "on land or water" provision in Section 44112(b)
and how that relates to preemption. Does "on land or water"
mean that the injury must occur there? Do the terms play a role
as an element of causation? Without further analysis by a court,
370 Id.
371 Id. at *15; see id. at *15 n.12.





377 H.R. REP. No. 103-180, pt. A (1993), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818.
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it is difficult to understand what effect "on land or water" will
have on the preemption argument.
E. THE STORY OF PREEMPTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY END
WITH SECTION 44112
There is almost always a potential that lawsuits in American
courts arising out of foreign aviation disasters will present a
choice of law issue. The choice of law issue may be raised by an
independent motion or raised indirectly through a motion to
dismiss under the forum non conveniens doctrine.
The presence of an American aircraft lessor as a defendant
may be a "jurisdictional hook" for the foreign plaintiff that
avoids a forum non conveniens dismissal.3 7 8 However, the court
may nevertheless apply the law of the foreign nation. What if
the foreign law conflicts with Section 44112? What if it conflicts
with the local state law?
The foreign law could, for example, impose absolute or strict
liability upon a commercial aircraft lessor for damages arising
from accidents involving aircraft leased by the lessor. The for-
eign law may not have any possession or control limitation upon
the liability of the lessor. The foreign law may not have a limita-
tion that the damage occur "on land or water." In short, a lessor
could find itself in a situation where it is in an American court
but foreign law applies, and the foreign law is far more hostile to
the interests of the lessor than under Section 44112.
What happens to the preemptive effect, if any, of Section
44112 if the American court determines that foreign law ap-
plies?3 79 In short, the foreign law applies and the preemptive
effect of Section 44112 is basically lost unless a public policy ar-
gument can be made to counter the application of foreign
law, 8 o or the application of foreign law would somehow be con-
378 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1991) (referring to U.S.
plaintiffs' lawyers seeking foreign plaintiffs from foreign accidents and using the
U.S. based defendants like a manufacturer as a 'jurisdictional hook"); see Esheva
v. Siberia Airlines, 499 F. Supp. 2d 493, 499 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding "a com-
pelling argument that Airbus was added to this litigation solely to provide some
American nexus to the litigation").
79 Note that under the forum non conveniens doctrine if the court deter-
mines that foreign law should apply, this is a factor that points towards but does
not compel dismissal. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 260 (stating that "the need to apply
foreign law pointed towards dismissal" in discussing the choice of law determina-
tion as part of the public factor analysis).
380 Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters of Miami, Inc., 225 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1955)
(stating "[i]t is settled law that no foreign tort action contrary to a strong public
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trary to a treaty to which the United States is a party, or applica-
tion of foreign law would interfere with American foreign
policy.38 1 What this means for the defendant aircraft lessor fac-
ing trial in the United States with foreign law being applied is
that it must put forth a strong public policy argument that
American law or Section 44112 should not be preempted," or
that the application of foreign law in this instance would affect
American foreign policy.
It is a central element of American law that a forum does not
need to apply foreign law if applying foreign law would threaten
the public policy of the forum.8 This exception to choice of
policy of the forum state can be maintained"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971); see also 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 18 (2008)
(commenting that
[i]t is a well-established general principle that courts are slow to
overrule the positive law of the forum, and that effect will not be
given to a foreign law if to do so would contravene the positive
policy of the law of the forum, whether or not that policy is re-
flected in statutory enactment. Thus, subject to constitutional limi-
tations, a court may (1) refuse to entertain a transitory action on
the ground that it offends the public policy of the forum or (2)
entertain the action but refuse to apply the foreign law on the
ground that such law violates the local public policy)
16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 19 (2008) (noting that "[i]nvocation of the pub-
lic policy of the forum as a bar to the enforcement of foreign rights of action
should be very narrowly limited"); 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 23 (2008).
381 See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (stating that
"valid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are");
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440 (1968) (holding that state laws "must give
way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy"); U.S. v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937). The effect of Garamendi in the aviation con-
text can be seen to preempt an application of state law that would conflict with
any international aviation treaty as well. See Belmont, 301 U.S. at 331. Thus, under
Garamendi, there is merit for the defendant aircraft lessor to determine whether
any treaty to which the United States is a party contains any provision that would
require application of United States aviation law.
382 See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 127 (2008) (stating that "the forum
court may refuse to give effect to a foreign statute [imposing vicarious liability]
on the ground that the statute is repugnant to its public policy"); 15A CJ.S. Con-
flict of Laws § 23 (2008) (noting that states may only refuse to give effect to for-
eign state law because of public policy reasons in '"extremely limited'
circumstances").
383 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (holding that "the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law in violation of
its own legitimate public policy"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 90 (1971) (stating "[n] o action will be entertained on a foreign cause of action
the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum");
see Sunbeam, 225 F.2d at 198 ("It is settled law that no foreign tort action contrary
to a strong public policy of the forum state can be maintained.").
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law principles exists to permit a forum to refuse "to apply a por-
tion of foreign law because it is contrary or repugnant to [the
forum's] own public policy." 84 The public policy exception has
a narrow application, however, and should only be applied
when the application of foreign law "would violate some funda-
mental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of
morals, some deep-seated tradition of the commonwealth," "
or is "prejudicial to the best interests of the citizens of the forum
state." 3 8 6
In Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. the Court of Appeals of
New York put forward a test for when public policy can be used
to overcome the application of another forum's substantive
law.387 First, it must be established that the substantive law to be
applied under the forum's choice of law is not the actual law of
the forum.38" From here, there must be evidence of an actual
and fundamental public policy of the forum.3 8 9 A forum's pub-
lic policy can "be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
precedents" of the forum. so0
Once both of these two elements have been established, the
party arguing for a public policy exception "has the burden of
proving that the foreign law is contrary to" the forum's public
policy.39 1 The burden of proof "is a heavy burden for public
policy is not measured by individual notions of expediency and
fairness or by a showing that the foreign law is unreasonable or
unwise."392
384 Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 687 (N.Y. 1985).
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr OF LAws § 90 cmt. c (1971) (quoting
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918); see Cooney v.
Osgood Mach., 612 N.E.2d 277, 285 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that "[i]n view of mod-
ern choice of law doctrine, resort to the public policy exception should be re-
served for those foreign laws that are truly obnoxious"); Am. Interstate Ins. Co. v.
G & H Serv. Ctr. Inc., 861 N.E.2d 524, 528 (Ohio 2007) (noting that "[t]he pub-
lic-policy exception . . . is narrow and should be applied only in rare
circumstances").
386 Am. Interstate Ins. Co., 861 N.E.2d at 528 (citing Jeffrey v. Whitworth Coll.,
128 F. Supp. 219, 222 (D. Wash. 1955)).
387 Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687-88; see also Am. Interstate Ins. Co., 861 N.E.2d at
528 (relying on Schultz and Cooney to determine if the law to be applied would be
contrary to Ohio public policy).
388 Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 687.
39 Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 67 (1945).
390 Id. at 67; id. at 68 (stating that "it is Congressional enactments which deter-
mine public policy"); see Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688 (noting that a forum's public
policy can be found "in the State's Constitution, statutes and judicial decisions").
391 Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688.
392 Id.
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This burden is satisfied by showing that the contacts between
the parties, the underlying tort, and the forum implicate the fo-
rum's public policy and are "substantial enough to threaten" the
forum's public policy.393 The mere fact that the substantive law
to be applied differs from or is less favorable than, the forum's
law is not enough on its own to warrant use of the public policy
exception."' The more marginal the contact the forum has
with the parties and the effects of the foreign law, the less reason
to find an exception under the guise of public policy.39 5 In es-
sence, the greater the relationship that the parties and the un-
derlying claim have to the forum and the forum's public policy,
the greater reason for the exception to apply.39 6
The underlying issue in Schultz stemmed from a tort claim
brought by a New Jersey plaintiff against a New Jersey charity in
New York because the underlying tort occurred in New York."'
The defendant charity argued that it was immune from suit be-
cause of New Jersey's charitable immunity law.398 The court,
having found that New York's choice of law rules pointed to the
application of New Jersey law, agreed."
The plaintiff tried to overcome the application of the charity
immunity law by arguing that the application of such a law in
New York was counter to New York's public policy because New
York did not have a charitable immunity provision.40 0 While it
found that applying the charitable immunity statute might be
contrary to New York public policy, because both parties were
residents of New Jersey, the court declined to apply the public
policy exception because there were insufficient contacts be-
tween New York, the parties, and the underlying tort.40'
Because Section 44112 is an act of Congress, it can be argued
that the statute represents the public policy of the United States.
Under Section 44112 and its predecessor statutes, Congress has
arguably stated that it is American public policy to not hold air-
craft lessors liable when the conditions of Section 44112 have
been fulfilled.40 2 The purpose behind this public policy is ar-
393 Id.; see Cooney v. Osgood Mach., 612 N.E.2d 277, 284-85 (N.Y. 1993).
394 Nadler v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 424 S.E.2d 256, 263 (W. Va. 1992).
39 Nadler, 424 S.E.2d at 264.
396 Id.
397 Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 682.
s98 Id.
3- Id. at 681.
400 Id. at 681, 687.
401 Id. at 688-89.
402 See 49 U.S.C. § 44112 (2006).
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guably two-fold: (1) encourage aircraft financing and (2) limit
the financial exposure of aircraft lessors to encourage the
growth of the aircraft leasing industry and hence the growth and
stability of airline services.4 0 3
Moreover, to be successful, an argument favoring a public pol-
icy exception based on Section 44112 would need to show that
the parties involved have significant contacts with the United
States,4 0 4 that Section 44112 would protect the lessor if Ameri-
can law was applied, and that allowing the foreign law to apply
would undercut the purposes behind the passage of Section
44112.405
F. THE SCOPE OF PREEMPTION UNDER SECTION 44112
REMAINS UNDETERMINED
The relative scarcity of cases discussing Section 44112 and the
clear disagreement amongst the courts over the preemptive ef-
fects of the statute make it apparent that the scope of preemp-
tion under Section 44112, if any, remains underdetermined.
Presumably, at the very least, there is some limited conflict pre-
emption under Section 44112. But how far should the preemp-
tive effect of the statute reach?
Is there a federal standard of care applicable to the liability of
commercial aircraft lessors for damages arising from the use of
their aircraft that must be reconciled with Section 44112? In
other words, is a lessor liable for careless or reckless operations
of air carriers to which it leases simply because the lessor has
authorized a lessee to use "aircraft, with or without the right of
legal control (as owner, lessee, or otherwise)?" 4 06 And how
should Section 44112 be reconciled with the federal standard of
lessor liability?
If there is no federal standard of care, should any state rem-
edy against lessors nevertheless be completely preempted be-
cause the federal government has completely occupied the field
of aviation safety under the FAA Act of 1958, including stan-
403 H.R. RFP. No. 80-2091 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1836-37.
404 Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 688.
-o Id. (citing cases where the court declined to apply foreign laws because they
were contrary to local public policy); see Cooney v. Osgood Mach., 612 N.E.2d
277, 284-85; cf Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense,
350 F.2d 468, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (finding that Brazil's interest in the financial
integrity of its airlines was a national public policy).
40 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2009).
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dards of care, and federal law under the Act does not recognize
a right to recover damages from an aircraft lessor?
If there is no field preemption, what is the scope of conflict
preemption under Section 44112? Should any state law allowing
recovery from an aircraft lessor be preempted whenever the les-
sor has leased the aircraft for at least thirty days and the lessor
does not have actual possession or control of the aircraft?
Or should the phrase "actual possession or control" be limited
in its interpretation? Should the phrase be limited to possession
or control at the time of the accident? Or should the phrase be
construed to apply to the moment when the alleged wrongful
conduct of the commercial lessor is deemed to have occurred?
If it is the latter, then arguably the lessor is not immune from
suit for negligent entrustment or products liability because the
alleged wrongful conduct of the lessor occurred when the air-
craft was in the possession or control of the lessor, although the
accident did not occur until later.
Should the phrase "possession or control" be interpreted to
allow potential suits for negligent supervision? In other words,
should the phrase allow for potential claims against the lessor
after the aircraft has been leased although the lessor has the
right to declare a default and recover possession of the aircraft
when the lessee has failed to maintain financial stability, when
the lessee has failed to properly maintain the aircraft, or when
the airline has subsequently been listed on the E.U. Blacklist, or
when the airline is from a nation that has been designated a
Class 2 country?
And irrespective of whether the lessor had "actual possession
or control" of the aircraft, should the courts limit the reach of
Section 44112 by placing teeth in the phrase "on land or water?"
Was it the intent of Congress when it originally passed Section
1404 to restrict the liability of lessors to damage which occurred
on the ground or water? An argument clearly exists that it was
difficult to anticipate the liability exposure sustained from dam-
age and death which would occur because of a ground impact,
and hence it was difficult for a lessor to secure the necessary
liability insurance at reasonable rates.
On the other hand, the liability exposure to passenger suits
could be quantified since the lessor would know the number of
passenger seats on any given aircraft. Should the lessor be sub-
ject to passenger suits when death or injury occurs from mid-air
collisions or explosions because the "damage" did not occur on
"land or water?" Or should the lessor only be liable for passen-
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ger death and injury even when the "damage" occurs because of
ground impact?
Finally, irrespective of the potential preemption of Section
44112, should there be a preemption of state suits against lessors
under the ADA? Would the unlimited liability of aircraft lessors
significantly impact the "rates, routes or services" of air carriers,
thus making the liability of lessors expressly preempted under
the rationale of Rowe? After all, more than half of the aircraft
operated by the world's airlines are under a lease agreement.407
An airline obviously is unable to provide "services," fly "routes,"
or "rate" fares unless it has aircraft to fly.
V. CONCLUSION: THE ANSWER TO IS LESSOR MORE?
REMAINS SHROUDED IN THE MISTS OF A
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL FOG
We began our discussion with the Air Philippines case and we
now return to that case. The potential remains that foreign air
disaster victims and their heirs, as in Air Philippines, will sue
American aircraft lessors in American courts to avoid dismissal
under the forum non conveniens doctrine or simply to have a
deep-pocket defendant to answer for the serious monetary
claims that mass disaster litigation invariably triggers. The
weather forecast remains "a possibility of Air Philippines's 'per-
fect storm' tomorrow."
But the MMTJA4 08 now makes it less likely that an Air Philip-
pines state court perfect storm will be the result.4 09 If the foreign
air disaster involves at least seventy-five deaths at a "discrete loca-
tion,"4 10 the lawsuits will probably be removable to federal court
where presumably the preemptive effect of Section 44112 will
receive a more sympathetic consideration.
Congress's intent in passing the MMTJA was to promote judi-
cial efficiency by simplifying the process for consolidating litiga-
tion stemming from one major accident into one court.41  The
4 Jason J. Killborn, Thou Canst Not Fly High with Borrowed Wings: Airline Finance
and Bankruptcy Code Section 1110, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 41, 42 n.6 (1999).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2006).
4 SeeJonathan M. Stem & Gordon S. Woodward, Cleared Direct to Federal Court:
Why Aviation Cases Are More Likely Than Other Types to Take Flight From State Courts,
in LITIGATING THE AVIATION CASE: FROM PRE-TIAL TO CLOSING ARGUMENTS 231,
239 (Andrew J. Harakas, ed., 3d ed. 2008).
410 Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50 (D.R.I. 2004).
411 Id. at 53-54; seeJoseph M. Creed, Choice of Law Under the Multiparty, Mul-
tiforum TrialJurisdiction Act of 2002, 17 REGENT U. L. REv. 157, 167-72 (2004).
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minimal diversity requirement for MMTJA is met as long as one
defendant and one plaintiff are citizens of different states.4 12
But a district court should abstain from exercising MMTJAjuris-
diction when (1) a "substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citi-
zens of a single State of which the primary defendants are also
citizens," and (2) the claims will be primarily governed by the
laws of that single state.4 1 3
The "substantial majority of all plaintiffs" provision of the
MMTJA depends upon "whether the number of potential plain-
tiffs from a single state makes up a substantial majority of all
potential plaintiffs with claims arising from the same disaster."4 1 4
"Substantial majority" should equal a number between two-
thirds and three-quarters of all the plaintiffs. 4 1  "Primary de-
fendants" means all defendants facing direct liability, not those
joined for secondary purposes like vicarious liability, indemnifi-
cation or contribution.4 16
A claim can originate in federal court under the MMTJA, or
can be removed to federal court via the removal provisions
found in Section 1441(e). 1 Once the case is removed, the fed-
eral court would retain the ability to dismiss the case because of
forum non conveniens.418
The MMTJA does not contain a choice of law provision.4 1 9
Thus, if the case is filed initially in federal court pursuant to the
grant of original jurisdiction of the MMTJA, the choice of law
issue should be resolved in accordance with traditional federal
choice of law rules. 4 2 0 But should the case be removed from
state court, there could be confusion over the choice of law
analysis.
The general rule, of course, is that the federal court will apply
the law of the state from which the case was removed.4 2 1 If the
412 28 U.S.C. § 1369(c) (1) (2006); see Flint v. La. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 06-2546, 2006 WL 2375593, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2006).
413 § 1369(b).
414 Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
415 Id. at 61.
416 Id. at 62.
417 Creed, supra note 411, at 159, 166.
418 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (6) (2006).
419 Creed, supra note 411, at 172.
420 Id.; see Judith R. Nemsick, Navigating Through the Chaos of a Choice of Law
Analysis in Aviation Accident Litigation, in LITIGATING THE AVIATION CASE: FROM
PRE-TRIAL TO CLOSING ARCUMENTS 191, 193 (Andrew J. Harakas, ed., 3d ed.
2008).
421 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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case was originally filed in state court but was removed under
Section 1441 to the consolidated MMTJA federal court, the fed-
eral court would probably apply the state's choice of law provi-
sions.42 2 If the case originated in a different federal court,
either under diversity or federal question, but was transferred to
the MMTJA consolidated court, then the choice of law rules of
the transferor court would apply. 4 2 3 In the end, the MMTJA
court could be faced with differing substantive law for multiple
litigants. 424
The enactment of the MMTJA is not the only important fed-
eral jurisdictional development to have taken place since Air
Philippines. The federal courts appear to have moved closer to-
ward acknowledging the existence of a complete federal field
preemption of aviation safety. 425 Non-diverse state-court actions
against aircraft lessors might therefore be removable even if the
MMTJA is not applicable.
The federal courts might even be prepared to recognize that
state law actions against lessors involving aircraft leased to air
carriers are preempted by the ADA if those actions could have a
significant impact on rates, routes or services. 2 A liability the-
ory often pled is that the lessor should have taken steps to
ground a leased aircraft when the lessor knew or should have
known the air carrier was behaving irresponsibly. A grounding
of an aircraft presumably would have an impact upon "routes"
since it is difficult to fly a route without an aircraft. And impos-
ing upon a lessor a responsibility to ground aircraft would ap-
pear to create a secondary private regulatory regime in the
already heavily government-regulated commercial air carrier
market.
These comments suggest the federal courts may be moving
toward recognizing that a single federal standard of care should
be applied to aircraft lessors. The federal standard, as arguably
already established by the FARs but previously unrecognized by
the courts, would inquire whether (1) the air carrier has been
422 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Creed,
supra note 411, at 172-73. See generally Nemsick, supra note 420, at 191-217
(describing the various choice of law rules applied in the United States).
423 Creed, supra note 411, at 175.
424 Id. at 176-77.
425 See Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 2007); Abdullah
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1999).
426 See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 372-73 (2008);
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 378-79 (1992).
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guilty of careless or reckless operation of the aircraft and (2) the
lessor "authorized" the air carrier to fly the aircraft.2 The fed-
eral standard of care would necessarily be subject to the limita-
tions, exceptions, and immunities granted by Section 44112.
Regardless of whether the forum is a federal or state court, a
defendant lessor will invariably be tempted to seek a dismissal of
American lawsuits arising from foreign air disasters under the
forum non conveniens doctrine.4 28 The defendant4 29 has the
burden of proving a more convenient forum.4"o And the plain-
tiffs forum choice is accorded deference; 3 1 however, a foreign
plaintiff is accorded less deference than a domestic plaintiff.4 3 2
Once an adequate alternative forum has been proven, the de-
fendant must show why certain public and private interest fac-
tors favor disturbing the plaintiffs choice of forum.43 3
427 14 C.F.R. §§ 1.1, 91.13 (2009).
428 Deborah Elsasser, The Doctrine ofForum Non Conveniens in the Context ofLitiga-
tion Arising out of Aviation Accidents, in LITIGATING THE AVIATION CASE: FROM PRE-
TRIAL TO CLOSING ARGUMENTS 289, 289 (Andrew J. Harakas, ed., 3d ed. 2008).
429 Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 43-44 (3d Cir. 1988).
4- See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1957); see also Gambra v.
Int'l Lease Fin. Corp., 377 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that for
an alternative forum to be adequate, a court "must find that (1) defendants are
amenable to process in the alternative forum, and (2) the subject matter of the
lawsuit is cognizable in the alternative forum so as to provide plaintiff[s] appro-
priate redress") (quoting Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 132
(E.D.N.Y. 2000)).
431 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259 (1981).
432 Id. at 256; Pollux Holding Ltd., v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 71
(2d Cir. 2002).
433 Private interest factors include:
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of un-
willing, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses;
possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as
to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court
will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often
said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum,
'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him
expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his
remedy.
Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508. Public Interest factors to be considered are:
Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled
up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury
duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a
community which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which
touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the
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Rightly or wrongly, naming the American aircraft lessor as a
defendant in foreign aircraft disaster litigation has come to be
seen as an effective device to avoid dismissal under the forum
non conveniens doctrine, particularly if the litigation remains in
state court. We have already seen how the Illinois state court
refused to dismiss under the doctrine.4 34 But other American
lessors in other courts have fared better when pursuing
dismissal.4 3 5
An aircraft lessor should carefully consider the implications
before seeking a dismissal pursuant to the forum non con-
veniens doctrine. Such a motion necessarily asks the court to
rule that foreign law will apply to the litigation.13 ' The court
may hold that foreign law does in fact apply but nevertheless
deny the motion under the public and private components of
the doctrine. The lessor might have effectively shot itself in the
foot if the foreign law provides that the lessor shall have vicari-
ous liability for the operational negligence of the foreign air car-
rier, that the lessor could be liable under a negligent
entrustment theory, or that the lessor could be strictly liable for
any defects in the design or manufacture of the aircraft. 3 1
trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the
country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home. There
is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case,
rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems
in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.
Id. at 508-09.
434 Ellis v. AAR Parts Trading Inc., 828 N.E.2d 726, 743 (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
2005) (quoting the trial court as saying
'it is incredulous for two Illinois resident corporations to argue that
their home state is inconvenient to them to litigate this matter. It is
also incredulous to observe that the defendants thoroughly ignore
the fact that the theories of liability pled against them concern the
alleged defective condition of the aircraft prior to its transfer to Air
Philippines, and there has been no assertion by the defendants that
the sources of proof, records, and witnesses on these issues are not
located in Illinois.').
5 See generally Esheva v. Siberia Airlines, 499 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
Siddi v. Ozark Aircraft Sys. LLC., Nos. 05-5170, 05-5206, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84882 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2006); Gambra v. Int'l Lease Fin. Corp., 377 F. Supp.
2d 810 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
436 Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 605 (10th Cir. 1998).
43 See Lory Barsdate Easton & Shelia A. Sundvall, Getting Out of Dodge: Defense
Pointers on jurisdictional Issues in Transnational Aviation Torts Litigation, in LITIGAT-
ING THE AVIATION CASE: FROM PRE-TRIAL TO CLOSING ARGUMENTS 327, 329 (An-
drew J. Harakas, ed., 3d ed. 2008). (noting that "the maxim 'Be careful what you
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The lessor would then long for the seemingly pro-lessor pro-
tection of Section 44112. But once foreign law becomes the ap-
plicable law, the lessor is relegated to arguing that foreign law
cannot apply because foreign law is in conflict with Section
44112 and hence unenforceable in an American court because
Section 44112 represents the fundamental public policy of the
United States.
But American law is not necessarily a warm and fuzzy blanket
insulating the commercial aircraft lessor from the massive litiga-
tion that flows from a major air disaster. American law remains
confused, undecided, and uncertain.
Even if Section 44112 is applicable to a foreign air disaster,
the scope of the statute remains unclear. The statute by its
terms limits its application to instances where the lessor does
not have "actual possession or control" of the aircraft. Should
the phrase refer to possession at the time of the alleged wrong-
ful conduct, which in a negligent entrustment case would be at
the time of entrustment? Or should the phrase refer to posses-
sion at the time of the accident?
Section 44112 says it applies to damages occurring "on land or
water." Does this mean that passenger deaths and injuries that
occur during flight do not come within the scope of the law?
Is there an argument, irrespective of whether there is immu-
nity for the lessor under Section 44112, that any state or foreign
effort to regulate the tort liability of the aircraft lessor runs afoul
of the ADA? Would tort liability imposed by state or foreign law
have a significant impact upon rates, routes, or services? And
are all of these arguments misplaced because Congress has al-
ready created a federal standard of care applicable to commer-
cial aircraft lessors, leaving the appropriate remedy to be
fashioned by either state or foreign law?
These and other questions remain shrouded in the mists of
judicial and legislative fog. Unless the U.S. Supreme Court
speaks to these issues with a clear and unequivocal voice it is
probable that aviation practitioners will be raising these same
questions for decades to come.
ask for ... because you might get it' applies with respect to a foreign forum," and
that defense counsel should ensure that they are "informed by the realities of the
potential foreign forum.").
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